Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties?

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In this introduction to vol. xxiv of the Bibliotheca Persica Tabari translation David Powers expresses the view that "although scholars disagree over whether the terms "Qays" and "Yaman" refer to tribal confederations, political parties, or interest groups, it is generally accepted that the Qays stood for the expansion of the empire and the exclusion of non-Arab clients, while the Yaman criticized the policy of expansion and advocated equal status for Arab Muslims and non-Arab converts to Islam."

One is slightly puzzled by this statement in that Qays and Yemen only stood for the policies in question if they were political parties, which cannot be disputed and generally accepted at the same time. But the thesis to which Powers refers, which is that of Shabani, certainly tends to win general acceptance among undergraduates, whether it has done so among their teachers is more difficult to say, but the fact that a scholar of Powers' stature should espouse it shows that it has survived better than it deserves— for Shabani's theory is so faulty that it should have been generally dismissed by now. Since it will not apparently be dismissed without a systematic demonstration of its errors, and since further it is tedious to explain its shortcomings year in and year out to undergraduates, the present article seeks to refute it once and for all.

In quotations from al-Tabari I sometimes follow, sometimes modify and sometimes depart freely from the translation to which reference is made.

1) I should like to thank Dr. G. R. Hawling for the comments on an earlier draft of this paper.


The problem

The problem to which Shaban addresses himself is the relationship between two apparently tribal groups in the Umayyad period. The genealogists divide the Arabs into sons of Isma‘il and sons of Qahtân, who are northerners and southerners respectively⁴; and according to the historians, this division was of acute importance in the later Umayyad period, in which the two descent groups would behave as rivals and engage in ‘asabiyya, ‘partisan behaviour’.

The historical sources usually refer to the two descent groups by different names, however. The label Qahtân does occur, but the most common designation for the southerners is ‘Abab al-Yaman or al-Yamamiyya, ‘Yemenis’. The northerners, on the other hand, are never referred to as ‘sons of Isma‘il’, possibly because this term tends to mean ‘Arabs’ bent court (the separate descent of the southerners notwithstanding⁵) and possibly because the northerners do not start branching out until we reach a certain ‘Adnân, so that they are adequately described as ‘descendants of ‘Adnân’. But since the only son of ‘Adnân to have descendants relevant to the Umayyad period was Nizâr, they were also subsumed as ‘Nizâr’ (or ‘Nizâriyya’). More commonly, however, they were known as ‘Musdar’ (or ‘Musdarriyya’), Musdar being one of Nizâr’s sons, or as ‘Qays’ (or ‘Qaysiyya’), Qays being a descendant of Musdar. Even the more inclusive term Musdar excluded some northerners, however, for Nizâr was the father not only of Musdar (and thus of Qays), but also of Rabî’a, the tribes of eastern Arabia. But the Rabî’a were a special case in that their allegiances went now to the northerners and now to the southerners, their Nizâri genealogy notwithstanding, so that when the sources speak of Qays or Musdar (henceforth Qays/Musdar) versus Yemen, they usually mean, and sometimes actually say, Qays/Musdar and Rabî’a versus Yemen, or Qays/Musdar versus Yemen and Rabî’a⁶.

What then was the rivalry about? In 1861 Dowy presented it as a carry-over from pre-Islamic Arabia, not only in the sense that the Arabs were unlikely to have shed their propensity to clamorishness and feuding immediately after their adoption of Islam, but also in the sense that there had been hostility between these very groups already in pagan times⁷. In 1902 this thesis was summarily dismissed by Wellhausen, who pointed out that there’s no antagonism between northerners and southerners in the pre-Islamic tradition and that it only made its appearance in the Islamic world during the Second Civil War: in Syria it was triggered by the battle of Marj Rahit (684 AD), in which the Kalb defeated the Qays, and in Baṣra, from where it spread to Khurasan, it was a response to tensions exacerbated by the immigration of Asd from Oman⁸. Both points have been generally accepted⁹. Wellhausen did not however explain why momentary hostility between Kalb (classically Yemenis) and Qays in Syria, or between Asd (classically Yemenis too) and Rabî’a on the one hand and Qays/Musdar on the other in Baṣra and Khurasan, should have continued throughout the Umayyad period or why it should have escalated to involve all Arab tribes, nor did he say whether the escalation took place along existing genealogical lines or on the contrary created them. But he clearly assumed the hostility to be authentically tribal and therefore, perhaps, in need of further explanation: once the feuds had started, they were bound to escalate and eventually divide the Arabs into two antagonistic groups whether this division had existed before (without being antagonistic) or not.

Thereafter little new was said on the subject until 1970–71, when Shaban published his first two books, Shaban did not offer any insight into the creation of the classical genealogies, being distinctly uninterested in the tribal organization and outlook of the early Arabs, and indeed irritated by the Western insistence on their importance. What he did offer was a conviction that the antagonism between Qays/Musdar and Yemen is unlikely to have remained a purely tribal phenomenon throughout the Umayyad period: “it is absurd to interpret this conflict as simply a tribal squabble”, as he puts it⁵⁰. This is true. No doubt the antagonism started as such a “squabble” in Syro-Jazira, Baṣra and Khurasan, and the protagonists did continue to speak in a manner reminiscent of feuding tribesmen (though neither point is conceded by Shaban): but one nonetheless gets the impression that some—

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⁶ Wellhausen goes so far as to include the Rabî’a under the label of Yemen (J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Rival, tr. M. G. Weir, Calcutta 1927, e.g. p. 210), which seems a bit excessive.
⁴° Wellhausen, Kingdom (first published in Berlin 1902), pp. 180f, 209f. Goldziher had earlier proposed that the antagonism developed out of rivalry between Quraysh and the Nunân (Muslim Studies, p. 99), but this hypothesis has rightly been ignored.
⁵ In ‘A. H. al-Kharrâṣî, Ta’rikh al-‘Iraq fi zill al-ḥabab al-Unawi, Cairo 1959, pp. 246ff, however, the antagonism starts in the days of the Rashidun.
⁶° Shaban, Islamic History, p. 120.
⁷ Isl. XXXI, 499f.
thing new had intervened to keep the hostility going, and indeed to change its nature, for the intensity of the 'asabiyah increased in direct proportion to the Arab loss of tribal ties. By the 740's the Arab had lived in the complex society of the Middle East for three generations, adapted to life in provinces of very different types, taken up careers as traders, scholars, soldiers and even peasants, admitted a huge number of non-Arab converts to their increasingly differentiated social, economic and cultural ranks, and adopted a wide variety of conflicting values and beliefs in the process. Neither subtribes nor tribes could act as units any more, still less could the larger descent groups of which they formed part. An Iraqi scholar of Sa'd/Tamim/Mudar, for example, would not feel obliged to side with a Sa'di soldier in Iraq on the basis of common descent, still less one with in Khurasan, or with all Tamimis, for the simple reason that there were no longer any common interests for the joint descent to articulate. Yet it is precisely in the 740's that the 'asabiyah between Qays/Mudar and Yemen culminates.

Shaban's solution
Shaban, then, puts his finger on a genuine problem. He solves it by postulating that the originally tribal labels of Qays/Mudar and Yemen came to stand for political parties in the Marwanid period (684-750 A.D.). Those who pledged their allegiance to Qays were committing themselves to a programme of continued military expansion on the one hand and segregation of Arab and non-Arab Muslims on the other, the ultimate aim of both policies being the preservation of Arab privileges; by contrast, those who pledged their allegiances to the Yemen were committing themselves to the end of expansion and the assimilation of non-Arab converts, their ultimate aim being the creation of a Muslim community in which Arabs and non-Arabs enjoyed the same position12. The foremost representative, indeed founder, of the Qaysi party was al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi, who served as governor of Iraq for 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I; and the majority of Umayyad caliphs opted for Qaysi governors, the notable exceptions being Sulayman and 'Umar II, though there was also a Yemeni interlude under Hisham. Eventually, the conflict engendered civil war, for the Yemenis staged a coup against al-Walid II in 744 and raised Yazid III to the throne; and though they were defeated by Marwan II, the last exponent of Qaysism, they won again at the hands of the 'Abbásids, whose revolution brought about the complete assimilation of Arabs and non-Arabs in Islam.

12) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 120.
13) P. Crone, Slaves on Horses, the Evolution of the Islamic Polity, Cambridge 1980, p. 42 and note 307 thereto; and appendix IV, nos 1-46 (where 49 men are covered; add Bishr b. Hafsa b. 'Abd bin al-Kalbi, one of the killers of al-Walid II, ibn 'Ashirr, Turrikh Mudhalat Dimashq, vol. 1, ed. M. A. Dahman, Damaskus n.d., p. 134). Four members of the Yanamiziyah were of Qays/Mudar (nos. 2, 12, 22) and one is of the Banu Hisham (no. 37).
14) Crone, Slaves, appendix IV, nos. 47-85. The four certain Yemenis are nos. 78-9, 83-4, the two possible ones are nos. 77, 82.
15) Shaban thinks it accidental that the fighting at Barqan was between Mudar and Yemen ('Abbasid Revolution, pp. 108 f.) Would he also claim that the prisoner freed by Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Ardi/Yemen out of regard for the Yanamiziyah merely happened to be of Khuzait/Yemen (al-Tabari, Turrikh al-ruhd wa'lamalik, ed. M. J. de Goeje and others, Leiden 1879-1901, ser. ii, p. 119 = M. Hinds (tr.), The History of al-Tabari, vol. xxiii, Albany 1990, pp. 635), that the Syrian...
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Sadly, the Qays and Yemen were under Arab authority, with their issues more relevant than those of tribal rivalries and jealousies.

The result is incoherent, but the denials are easily discounted. In short, it could well be that the tribes subsumed under the label of Mu‘āḍar had developed different political views from those subsumed as Yemen.

Where is the debate?

But if Qays/Mu‘āḍar and Yemen subscribed to different ideals, why did they never say so? It is not as if the Arabs of the Umayyad period were reluctant to air their views; on the contrary, their culture was highly argumentative. People were forever debating the rights and wrongs of the participants in the First Civil War, the legitimacy or otherwise of the Umayyads, the nature of the caliphate, the limits of obedience, the status of the sinner, the nature of God, free will versus predestination and much more besides. But of debates about expansion and assimilation between Qays/Mu‘āḍar and Yemen there is not a trace. The two groups do not in fact seem to have engaged in debates of any kind before their rivalry turned into civil war.

This point has been made before, but without illustrations of how the participants actually talked.

(a) According to Shaban, the appointment of ‘Umar b. Hudhayra al-Fazari/Qays to Iraq in 102/720 marked the return of Qaysi policies after Sulayman and ‘Umar II’s Yemeni interlude.

(b) Ibn Hudhayra was indeed conscious of his membership of Qays.

(c) He once asked his companions, who politely replied that he was; but he disagreed, giving the answer as al-Kawthar b. Zufar al-Kil‘abi/Qays, the son of a famous chief from Qinnasrin, on the grounds that he only has to sound the bugle at night and twenty thousand men will show up without asking why they have been summoned.

Of himself he merely said that he was always pursuing the best interests of Qays. A Fazari bedouin objected that “if you really had the best interests of Qays in mind, you would not have ordered your horseman par excellence (fāris) to be slain”, with reference to the fact that Ibn Hudhayra had given orders for Su‘id al-Harash/Wa‘ṣat/Qays, the recently deposed governor of Khurasan, to be tortured to death; and Ibn Hudhayra duly cancelled the order. Other Qaysi too, disapproved of the treatment that Ibn Hudhayra had meted out to Su‘id: “You have put the horseman of Qays in chains and disgraced him”, Ma‘ṣib b. ‘Urwa al-

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1) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 120.
2) Crone, Slaves, p. 42.
3) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 137.
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his acceptability to Tamim, who were also Mudaris and who constituted the majority of the Khurasani troops.)

(c) In 100/718  Jarrāḥ b. 'Abdallāh al-Hakami/Yemen was described to 'Umar II as a crude 'asabi, and if we follow Shaban, he must have been an 'asabi on behalf of his political party. Since he was a Yemeni by descent, yet associated with al-Hājājī, the reader wonders which party he had sided with, but the speech reported in illustration of his 'asabiyya merely has him tell the Khurasanis that 'I came to you with solicitude [for all of you], but now I am partisan of 'asabiyya; by God, one man from my people (qarān) is dearer to me than hundred others.' He is plainly a declaration of partiality for his Yemeni descent group. Shaban nonetheless has Jarrāḥ declare himself biased in favour of the Arabs, the statement being a declaration of support for the anti-assimilationist policies of al-Hājājī's party. When Asad al-Qasri/Yemen transferred the troops from Razzāq to Balkh, somebody warned him that they would engage in partisan behaviour (tajjallī 'asabiyya) if they were settled in fifth (the tribal units in which the Khurasan army was divided), to which Asad reacted by settling them in a mixed pattern instead. Even Shaban would hardly construe this as a warning that the troops would engage in debates over the desirability of assimilation if they were settled in tribal units, a prospect so disagreeable to Asad that he settled them otherwise.

(d) In 109/727 Asad was himself accused of stirring up 'asabiyya, for which he was dismissed and of which the following is given as an example: 'Asad took partisan action against fatīha 'alīt.' Naṣr b. Sayyār [al-Kināni] and some Mudarīs who were with him and had them lashes. He [also] made an oration one Friday in which he said, 'May God blacken these faces, the faces of people of dissension, hypocrisy, disturbance and corruption. Oh God, separate me from them and take me to my place of hikma and fatherland. Few are those who covet what is in my hands or who speak up, [for] the Commander of the Faithful is my maternal uncle,  Khālid b. 'Abdallāh is my brother, and with me I have twelve thousand Yemeni swords.' To Shaban, this means that Asad punished Naṣr and other Arab

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27) Wellhausen takes Hishām to have appointed Naṣr because his tribes was small (Kingdom, pp. 474f.). But this seems to be contradicted by the reference to his kinship with Tamim.


leaders for their opposition to his projected alliance with the Hepzibails, the impracticability of this alliance being the real reason why he was dismissed. In 744 the Yemenis murdered al-Walid II, who was alleged to have vented his pro-Qaysi feelings in poetry such as this: "...We are those who rule men by force...We have scammed on the Asb’arâs [Yemen] with the Night of Qays...Behold Khalid [al-Qasri/Yemen] a prisoner in our midst! Would you not have defended him if they had been men?...As for Kinda and Sakin [Yemen], they have never risen up again...". One Yemeni poet retorted that "We gave long battle-days to the tribes of Nizar on the morning of Marj [Râhid]....When you confront Sakin and Kalb [Yemen] with the 'Abs (var. Qays), you may be sure that [the letter's] sovereignty is at an end...". Another boasted that al-Walid had been killed by Kalb/Yemen and Mshâbib/Yemen; yet another rhetorically asked whether "a single soul from Mudar came to his defence?" The poems are replete with tribal names; Yemeni martyrs such as Ibn al-Ash'ath, the Muhallabids and Khalid al-Qasri are defended against charges of ignominy, the argument being that they were noble warriors and that "Khalid used to provide shrudots for the dead of Nizar", not that these people had fallen in a good cause. One would hardly infer from all this that the Yemenis had joined the Yamaniyya "regardless of their nominal tribal affiliations" or that the Yamaniyya was a party advocating "practical measures to meet rapidly changing social conditions".

That the participants should have been abusive is not surprising: participants in religious debates were not invariably polite. But the abuse never takes the form of 'you are foolish/corrupt/rebellious in adhering to such and such views', always 'you are not my people and therefore weak and ignoble'. It is of course for this reason that the sources identify the antagonist as 'asbâbiyya: the protagonist defended their people, right or wrong, not their party with reference to its rectitude.

The parties in action

Though Qays/Mudar and Yemen never identify their political convictions in words, they could still display them in action; but their supposed convictions are not reflected in their behaviour either, as the following examination of the Marwanid period should suffice to show.

(i) 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I (685-715).

According to Shabon, 'Abd al-Malik and al-Walid I were supporters of Qays. Let us start, then, by reviewing the governors they appointed to their main provinces.

Egypt:

'Abd al-'Aziz b. Marwân/Umayyad
Abdallâh b. 'Abd al-Malik/Umayyad
Qurar b. Shawk al-'Abzi/Qays

North Africa:

Zuhayr b. Qays al-Balawi/Yemen
Hasan b. al-Nur'mân al-Ghassani/Yemen
Músâ b. Nusayr, masâ’il of Lakham/Yemen and/or the Umayyads; also claimed as a genuine Lakhmi/Yemeni or Balawi/Yemeni or Bakri/Balad

Iraq:

Bishr b. Marwân/Umayyad
al-Bajîj b. Yûsuf al-Thaqafl/Qays.

Shabon, 'Abbasid Revolution, pp. 108f.
Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1782 = Hordenbrand, p. 134, where mâtâ ‘talqīh ‘l-Sakîn” nas-tāna ‘Abdî ‘l-'Abîb” has been taken to mean “when(ever) you confront the Sakin and the Kalb and the ‘Abs.”
Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1822, ult. = Hordenbrand, p. 178, where asqâq Mshâbib has been taken to mean ‘the forefathers of Mshâbib’ rather than ‘the Mshâbib competitors’ (trying to kill al-Walid before the Kalbis did). The forefathers were obviously not in a position to participate.
Shabon, Islamic History, pp. 124, 158.

\[33] Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1782 = Hordenbrand, p. 134, where mâtâ ‘talqīh ‘l-Sakîn” nas-tāna ‘Abdî ‘l-'Abîb” has been taken to mean “when(ever) you confront the Sakin and the Kalb and the ‘Abs.”
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\[37] Shabon, Islamic History, pp. 124, 158.

\[38] E4, s.v.
\[40] E4, s.v.
\[43] E4, s.v.
There is no systematic preference for men of Qaysi/Mudar descent here. More strikingly, there is no such preference in the appointments made by al-Hajjaj, the Qaysi governor of the East for ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid: of the forty-eight men known to have received appointments from him, twenty-five were of Qays/Mudar, nineteen of Yemen and four of Pabdi’s. One would infer from this that Qays/Mudar and Yemen had not yet come to be associated with rival political views.

This is corroborated when we turn to the policies pursued under ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid. Both caliphs certainly supported a programme of expansion: it was in their reigns that Qutayba b. Muslim began the conquest of Central Asia, that Mūsā b. Nuṣayr occupied Spain and that Muhammad b. al-Qāsim embarked on the conquest of India. But Mūsā b. Nuṣayr was a Yemeni (by wādī), while al-Muhallab, ‘Abd al-Malik’s Yemeni governor of Khurasan, had spent his entire life fighting wars of conquest before taking on the Azraqite campaigns for which he was rewarded with the governorship of Khurasan, so one must conclude that Yemen still had not come to be associated with a policy of non-expansion.

Nor does the evidence suggest that Qays/Mudar had come to stand for a policy of apartheid. The bureaucracy was headed by mawla, which was not particularly remarkable since it had always been dominated by non-Arabic.

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but the first appointment of a mawla to a judgeship in Iraq was allegedly made by al-Hajjaj: the Iraqis were so outraged by the appointment that the mawla did not take it up. As regards military positions, ‘Abd al-Malik (or his brother ‘Abd al-‘Azīz) appointed the client Mūsā b. Nuṣayr to North Africa, and Mūsā in his turn appointed his client Tāriq to Spain. This is perhaps not remarkable either given that the first mawla governor of North Africa had been appointed in the time of Mu‘awiya. When ‘Abd al-Malik appointed a client to a military command against the Byzantines, he was once more following a precedent set in the time of Mu‘awiya. But he also appointed a client to the governorship of Qinnasrin, and yet another to Medina, while al-Hajjaj is said (probably wrongly) to have appointed a


Thus al-Mubarrad, al-‘Kūmil, ed. W. Wright, Leipzig 1864–65, p. 245, on Salt b. ‘Alī, Juyayn. This passage was first adduced by S. A. al-‘Alī, al-Thulqam al-‘arba‘in wa-liqā‘iyat al-Baqara, 1st edn., Beirut 1957, p. 326, 401, one wonders whether he had really intended him for the qayb itself; and he certainly did not appoint Ibn Duraj. The context in which Ibn Duraj is mentioned (Mubarrad, Kūmil, p. 286; Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, al-Iqlīf al-farid, ed. A. Amin and others, Cairo 1946–49, vol. iii, p. 417) does suggest that he was a contemporary of al-Hajjaj; but the verse describes al-Hajjaj as dead, and Ibn Duraj was in fact judge of Kufa under Harun; he died in 182 (Wa‘lī, ʿAbd al-qawd, ed. A. A. al-Marāqī, Cairo 1947–50, vol. iii, pp. 182ff.; Ibn ‘Abd al-Qadr, Tuhfah, Hyderabad 1925–27, vol. v, pp. 482ff.).

Baladhuri, Fustah, pp. 230ff.


Khafila b. Khayyār, Tāriqah, ed. S. Zakkiyar, Damascus 1947–8, p. 198, cf. 102, on ‘Ubaydallāh b. Rabāh, whose father was a prisoner-of-war from ‘Ayn Tamr captured together with the father of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr. Al-‘Alī is mistaken when he claims that the first mention of a mawla commanding an army refers to the revolt of al-Muhtār (Tārīqah, p. 97n.).


Tabari, ser. ii, p. 834, 852, 854, on Tāriq, mawla of ‘Uthman.
client of his to the šurta in Iraq\textsuperscript{46}). It is also under ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Walid that clients begin routinely to appear in the army, not just as servants accompanying their masters in the field (a role in which one continues to find them\textsuperscript{47}), but also as regular soldiers, be he in Syria, Egypt, Iraq or Khorasan\textsuperscript{48}). We are told that there were 7,000 mawdū‘ soldiers in Khorasan under Qutayba, where they outnumbered 4th al-Qays (4,000) and were numerically on a par with Bakr b. Wā’il (7,000), though they were outnumbered by Qays and other Ahl al-‘Alîya (9,000), by Tamim (10,000) and by the Aṣz (10,000)\textsuperscript{49}).

Shaban presumably credits al-Ḥajjāj and his caliphal employers with a policy of discrimination because the former repatriated fugitive peasants\textsuperscript{50}). Peasants fled in a variety of directions, but many headed for the garrison cities where they claimed to be converts in the hope of escaping their taxes and receiving membership of the dawān. Al-Ḥajjāj did not accept their conversion and sent them back to their villages, where they continued to be liable for the taxes they had tried to escape, a policy for which he doubtless had caliphal support and which the sources condemn as ‘putting poll-tax on Muslims’\textsuperscript{51}). This was certainly a distinctive policy, but it was not a policy towards mawdū‘. Clients were non-Arab who had been accepted as members of Muslim society, usually with and occasionally without conversion, and who had proof of their membership in the form of their patron. But the


\textsuperscript{47} Cf. Cronen, Slaves, note 272.

\textsuperscript{48} Cronen, Slaves, p. 38 and the notes thereto.

\textsuperscript{49} Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1290ff.; cf. also Baladhuri, Fūḥšī, p. 243.

\textsuperscript{50} Cf. Shaban, Islamic History, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{51} Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1122 = Firdw, p. 67; Baladhuri, Anṣāb, vol. xi, pp. 338ff. (al-Ḥajjāj’s fiscal agents wrote that the kharij was in arrears, the dhimmis having converted and gone to the umair; so he wrote to Bāṣa and elsewhere ordering them to be returned to their villages); Muhammad, Kāmil, p. 286; Ibn ‘Abī Rabī‘ ibn ‘Uthmān, Fī ṭalā‘ah al-ḥirr, ed. C. C. Torrey, New Haven 1932, pp. 105ff (the fact to collect poll-tax from converts was al-Ḥajjāj in Iraq; ‘Abd al-Malik wanted the same to be done in Egypt, but his brother and governor there was allegedly dissuaded). Cf. also D. Dennett, Conversion and the Poll Tax in early Islam, Cambridge Mass. 1950, pp. 38, 82ff.

\textsuperscript{46} Cf. EI, s.v. ‘mawdū‘; P. Cronen, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law, Cambridge 1987, pp. 361f., 90.

\textsuperscript{52} Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1435 = Powers, p. 185; Jāhānshāhī, Waṣa‘, p. 57, on Yazid b. Abi Muslim (cf. above, note 50). Baladhuri, Fūḥših, p. 231; and Ibn ‘Idhārī, Bayān, vol. i, p. 48, give a different reason for his assassination.

\textsuperscript{47} al-Amād, al-Ḥajjājī, p. 348, citing the Cairo manuscript of Baladhuri’s Anṣāb.

\textsuperscript{48} Cf. J. M. M. Judd, al-’Arab wa-l-ard fi l-‘Irāq fi nafs al- ($.\textsuperscript{49})\textsuperscript{2}\textsuperscript{3} al-Baisam, [’Amāmān] 1978, p. 212.\textsuperscript{49} Cf. EI, s.v. ‘mawdū‘, col. 879a.

\textsuperscript{50} Shaban, ‘Abbasid revolution, p. 73; id., Islamic History, p. 175. runaway peasants repatriated by al-Ḥajjāj were dhimmis aspiring to recognition as mawdū‘; some did find patrons to legalize their presence, others undoubtedly contrived to hang on without them, but many were deported as illegal immigrants. They were mawdū‘ in the eyes of the sources, a mawdū‘ to them being simply a non-Arab Muslim, but not in the eyes of the authorities, a mawdū‘ to them being a non-Arab whose presence in Muslim society was endorsed by an accredited member of this society\textsuperscript{48}). The distinction is important because the so-called mawdū‘ grievances that figure so strongly in the secondary literature were in fact grievances nourished by dhimmis outside Muslim society, not by the clients within. A client was a naturalized citizen, so to speak, and whatever problems he might encounter in Muslim society, repatriation and demands for poll-tax were not among them. It was a mawdū‘ who applied al-Ḥajjāj’s policy towards dhimmis seeking client status in North Africa\textsuperscript{49}); being insiders, clients had as strong an interest as their patrons in keeping the dhimmis out.

Shaban, however, thinks that the caliphs and their governors must have discriminated against mawdū‘ too, and no doubt they did in the sense that they were prejudiced against them. Non-Arabs were inferior beings in Arab eyes, presumably including those of ‘Abd al-Malik and al-Ḥajjāj; the latter figures among those who tried to prevent mawdū‘ from marrying Arab women\textsuperscript{44}), and both he and ‘Abd al-Malik clearly employed mawdū‘ because the latter were too numerous and too skilled to be ignored, not because they envisaged God as presiding over a Racial Relations/Equal Opportunities Board. But official measures of discrimination are hard to document. There is good evidence that clients received lower pay in the army than their Arab counterparts, at least in some places\textsuperscript{50}); but the widespread notion that they received no pay at all is mistaken\textsuperscript{48}), and Shaban does not adduce it. What he does adduce is rather the fact that mawdū‘ in the army were placed in a unit of their own rather than dispersed in the quarters or fifths of their patrons\textsuperscript{48}). He even discerns a segregationist policy behind the fact that
the Arabs were divided into tribal units, taking it to mean that "[in Khurasan] they were deliberately kept outside the structure of Iranian society", being organized "by Qutayba along tribal lines to emphasize the division of the two communities". But to take the second point first, it was not of course Qutayba who had introduced the Arab units. The Arab had been divided into tribal quarters (in Egypt, Syria and Iraq) and fifths (in Basra and Khurasan) since the time of Mu'awiya, having previously been divided into tribal units of other kinds; hence also could a tribal population possibly be organized? It is perfectly true that the tribal nature of Arab society reinforced the gulf between the conquerors and the conquered and that assimilation would have been easier without it, in the sense that the conquerors might have been absorbed and eventually disappeared (a possibility Shaban never envisages). But their tribal organization was a given which could not simply be thought away, and which no Arab wanted to think away, he be a Qaysi or a Yemeni, partly because he took pride in it and partly because he could point to his own disappearance. "Do not be like the Nabataeans of the Sawad who, when asked about their origins, say that they come from such and such a village", as 'Umar I is reputed to have said.

As regards the first point, one may grant Shaban that the separate organization of the mawālik reflects prejudice. Non-Arab Muslims were affiliated to individual patrons and took their patron's side in the rivalry between Qays/Mudar and Yemen, yet they were treated as a tribe of their own. The prejudice was not Qaysi, however, but rather pan-Arab. All the Arabs saw mawālik as forming a group of their own, clearly because collective clientage had been the normal mechanism whereby non-Arabs were placed under Arab protection in the pre-Islamic past; and mawālik had their own streets and mosques to match their separate regiments, a fact which even Shaban would hardly credit to Qaysi policies. Yemenis were as prejudiced as anyone else. The idea that their pre-Islamic lifestyle should have made them more tolerant of non-Arabs than their northern counterparts is not in fact persuasive. For one thing, the sons of Qahtān included numerous tribesmen such as the Kalb who did not come from settled South Arabia at all, but rather acquired their southern genealogy in the course of the Umayyad period and who had been (and indeed continued to be) bedouin on a par with the Qays. For another thing, settled tribes no less tribal than nomadic ones, and the modern tribesmen of South Arabia can hardly be said to be noted for their tolerance of non-tribesmen, who form (or until recently formed) unarmored groups under tribal protection on such a scale that South Arabia is sometimes loosely described as a caste society. One is hardly surprised, then, to find that no Yemeni governor is described as having complained of, or tried to change, the separate organization of the mawālik in the army. (What the clients themselves felt about it is not recorded.)

In short, 'Abd al-Malik, al-Walid and their governors did not systematically prefer governors of Qays/Mudar nor did they pursue a policy of discrimination against clients, however prejudiced they may have been against them. They did pursue a policy of expansion, and they did refuse to admit non-Arab peasants seeking membership of the Muslim community, but neither policy was peculiar to Qays/Mudar or unacceptable to Yemen at this stage.

(ii) Sulaymān and 'Umar II (715–21)

This takes us to the two reigns which constituted a Yemeni interlude according to Shaban. Once again, we may start with the governors.

Egypt:
Sulaymān: 'Abd al-Malik b. Rifa‘a al-Fahmi/Qays
'Umar II: Ayyūb b. Shu‘abī al-‘Aṣbahī/Yemen

22) Islam LXXI, 391 ff.
North Africa:
Sulaymān: Muhammad b. Yazīd, maṣā'id of Quraysh or Ansār
 suitable: 'Abdallāh b. Mūhājir, maṣā'id of Ansār

Ismā'īl b. 'Ubaydallāh b. Abī l-Mūhājir. maṣā'id of Quraysh

Iraq:
Sulaymān: Yazīd b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi/Yemen
 suitable: (Bay'ra) 'Abī b. Artāb al-Qaṭārī/Qays
suitable: (Kufa) Abī l-Ja'dīd b. Abī l-Raḥmān/Quraysh

Khurāsān:
Sulaymān: Yazīd b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi/Yemen
 suitable: 'Abdallāh b. Khākān/Yemen
suitable: (military) Abī l-Raḥmān b. Nu'aym al-Ghāmīdī/Yemen
suitable: (fiscal) Abī l-Raḥmān b. Abī l-Dhābīl al-Qaṣāyir/Qays
suitable: (fiscal) 'Uqba b. Zār'a al-Ta'i/Yemen

Sulaymān dismissed most of his predecessor's governors, appointing a client to North Africa, a Yemeni to Iraq and Khorasan, and confirming a Qaysi in office in Egypt. We do not know what he would have done if he had ruled for twenty years instead of two and a half, but as Eissner notes, one cannot credit him with a clear preference for Yemenis. Of the seventeen men known to have received appointment from Yazīd b. al-Muhallab in Iraq and Khorasan, however, only one was a Qaysi, fourteen being Yemenis and one a Rabi'ite. This does suggest incipient polarization between Qays/ Mudar and Yemen, if only at a provincial level, so can they be shown to stand for rival policies by now?

Yemen certainly had not come to stand for the end of expansion or the behaviour of Sulaymān (at a metropolitan level) is anything to go by, for apart from the fact that the conquest of Spain continued in his reign, he mounted the greatest assault ever made by the Arabs on Constantinople, expending vast sums on the enterprise and swearing not to leave his camp at Dalälī in northern Syria until it had been crowned with success. To Shaban, this was an anti-expansionist measure in disguise in that it was meant to "end the ceaseless and exhausting campaigns along the Byzantine front". No doubt one could have said the same if Sulayman had sworn to conquer al-Hijāz in its entirety, the simplest way of eliminating frontier warfare being the elimination of frontiers altogether. Shaban does unhappily note that "in some respects" Sulayman's foreign policy "seemed to be an intensification of previous policies" or "almost an extension of Hājāj's policy", but on what does base the qualification? Sulayman continued Hājāj's attempt to conquer western India too, the Syrian troops in Hind (like those in Anatolia) being told to feed themselves by cultivating the land until they had completed the job: "no Syria for you", as he put it in his letter. And (at a provincial level) Yazīd b. al-Muhallab likewise pursued an expansionist policy in Khorasan. According to Shaban, he merely aimed at consolidation already made (pursuing an anti-imperialist policy for which he brought some 90,000 Syrian troops to Khorasan): "He is reported to have objected to Qutayba's policy of furthering the Arab conquests in central Asia while leaving behind him, in Gurgan and Tabaristan, hostile territory which might threaten his line of communication in Iraq", Shaban says. This is correct, but it wholly fails to convey the spirit in which the objection was made: according to the passage cited, Sulayman and Yazīd were curious of Qutayba's conquests and wanted to do better. "Don't you see what God is accomplishing through Qutayba?", Sulaymān would ask, to which Yazīd would haughtily reply that "they are nothing, Jurjān is what counts", adding the point made by Shaban. When Yazīd became governor, "his sole ambition was to conquer Jurjān", in Tabaristan he initially refused an offer of peace because he wanted to acquire it by conquest; in Jurjān he swore that "he would neither loosen his hold on them nor raise the sword from them until he had mixed [their] blood into wheat, made bread of the mixture and

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89) Wellhausen, Königdom, pp. 329f., 299. Quraysh were usually regarded as a neutral group, cf. Tabārī, s.r., ii, p. 869, where this view is explicit; cf. also Azdī, Mawṣīl, p. 219, line 9.


92) Eissner, Suleymān, p. 139.

93) Crane, Stāmas, Appendix III, nos. 48–64.
eaten the bread"^39); and having conquered Jurjân and fulfilled his oath, he wrote to Sulaymân boasting that he had accomplished something which the Sasanid emperors Shapur II, Khosraw I and Khosraw II had been unable to achieve and which had likewise proved too difficult for 'Umar, 'Uthmân and subsequent caliphs of God^40. One would infer that Yazid was out to prove himself a greater conqueror than anyone else, not that he felt expansion to be undesirable.

There is of course no guarantee that Yazid b. al-Muhallab ever said anything of the kind, all we have are statements of what he must or ought or could have said in the eyes of later historians. (Mutatis mutandis this is true of all the evidence discussed in this article.) But Shaban does not argue that the sources misrepresent Yazid, that the statements credited to him must be rejected, that there is evidence of an altogether different Yazid behind the façade, or the like; he does not engage in source critical analysis of any kind. What he does is rather to adumbrate sources saying A in support of the contention that they mean B, on the grounds that if you ignore their general import and supply an alternative message yourself, then some of the words they use would fit the alternative message too. It is for the reason that Hawting characterizes his theories as "only loosely related to the sources" and that Eisener repeatedly dismisses them as "pure speculation"^41. Shaban in fact treats the sources as traditional Muslims scholars treated their qiyâl, that is to say as so many pegs on which to hang theories of contemporary inspiration, not as sources properly speaking; his concern is with the message one can read into them rather than what one can deduce from them by immersing oneself in their bygone modes of thought. This is the fundamental reason why his work must be rejected.

But let us return to the survey. As regards masâlī, there is not much evidence that Sulaymân had special policies towards them, and Shaban adduces none. "On balance he continue the same imperial policy as his immediate predecessors, only softening it by trying to bring in the non-Arabs into this structure", he claims^42, now conceding that there was no change in foreign policy; but who are the non-Arabs in question? Sulaymân appointed a masâlī to North Africa, but so did his predecessor; he was hostile to the masâlī appointed by his predecessor, i.e. Músâ b. Nuṣayr, but obviously not because the latter was a masâlī or (in Shaban's view) an assimilationist^43; Músâ's ethnic origin were as irrelevant to his downfall as were his policies towards the Berbers^44. According to an Egyptian traditionalist, Sulaymân raised the stipends of masâlī from twenty to twenty-five (dinars); but since the same source informs us that 'Abd al-Malik had previously raised it from fifteen to twenty and that 'Ilâhî was later to raise it from twenty-five to thirty, the measure obviously is not envisaged as a change of policy^45.

Sulaymân's views on runaway dhimmīs are also badly attested. One source claims that he put right what al-Ḥajāj had destroyed and "redressed grievances, released prisoners and radda 'l-manfiṣān, i.e. allowed exiles to come back"^46. This is hardly a reference to the return of exiled peasant converts^47. But another version of the same passage states that Sulaymân released prisoners and radda 'l-manfiṣān, i.e. released back the Basran converts that al-Ḥajāj had repatriated in the aftermath of Ibn al-Aslâth's revolt after branding the names of their villages on their hands^48. This version adds that al-Ḥajāj wished to oust the masâlī from their position of

^39) "From the very beginning of the conquest the Berbers... were granted equal status with the Arab tribesmen as long as they accepted Islam and joined the Arab armies" (Shaban, Islamic History, p. 150), a statement in which Músâ's policies must be included.

^40) Like so many other governors, Músâ kept getting into trouble over money. In Iraq he had embezzled funds which he later repaid with the help of 'Abd al-'Azîz b. Marwân (thus Ibn 'Idhârî, Bayân, vol. i, pp. 306f.; cf. above, note 50). Having embarked on the conquest of Spain, he was recalled by al-Walid, but the latter had died by the time he arrived in Syria, and it was Sulaymân who extorted large sums of money from him (Lafuente, Ajar, pp. 19, 29f.; compare Ibn Qutayba, 'Umar, vol. ii, pp. 81f.). Sulaymân also ordered his masâlī governor of North Africa to confiscate the wealth of Músâ's family and the latter duly had them tortured and killed (thus Ibn 'Idhârî, Bayân, vol. i, p. 47; cf. also Wellhausen, Königsmacht, p. 296).

^41) Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, 'Irsh, vol. iv, p. 400. Al-Khartûbî, whose understanding of Sulaymân is similar to Shaban's, nonetheless adduces it as evidence that Sulaymân reversed al-Ḥajâj's policy towards non-Arab Muslims (al-İraq, p. 179). Eisener questions its reliability (Sulaiman, p. 82).

^42) M. J. de Goeje (ed.), Fragmenta Historiorum Arabicorum Lœdon 1871, p. 17. This passage was drawn to my attention by Dr. G. R. Hawting.

^43) Exile was a common form of punishment in the Umayyad period (cf. Kh. 'Athâmin, 'Uqdat al-nasyr fi sadr al-Islâm wa'l-dawla al-unmâyiyya', al-Kamil 5 (1984); and a caliph as early as 'Uthmân is said to have redressed grievances by allowing exiles to come back (cf. below, note 201).

^44) Mubarrad, Kâmî, p. 286. Mubarrad does not name an authority for his account, but the parallel (though shorter) version in Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, 'Irsh, pp. 480f., is cited from al-Ḫalîâl Kifah al-mawsîl wa-l-carâb, on which see C. Polots, 'Gäbeisana III. Essai d'inventaire de l'œuvre Gâbeisennè', Arabica 3 (1956) no. 23.
preeminence in cultural activities, seeing that they had sided with Ibn al-
Ash'ath, and so ordered them out of Basra whereas the Arabs were allowed
to stay; and back in their villages the converts produced a new generation
of children whose language and manners were coarsened to the point that
when Sulaymān allowed them back, they seemed to be Nabataeans116. All
this is clearly evidenced. For one thing, there were only fifteen years be-
tween Ibn al-Ash'ath's revolt and Sulaymān's accession (700 and 715 A.D.
respectively), which hardly suffices for the transformation of cultural lead-
ers into Nabataean peasants. For another, al-Hajjāj only exiled runaway
dhimmi, not mawālī in the global sense of non-Arab Muslims. The mawālī
who were cultural leaders in Basra were sons of prisoners-of-war and fully-
pledged members of Muslim society. There were men such as al-Hasan al-
Bāṣrī, a soldier who had participated in the conquest of eastern Iran, or Ibn
Sirin, the husband of an Arab woman117, not to mention the mawālī in
charge of al-Hajjāj's Basran bureaucracy; and al-Hajjāj did not of course
despatch such men to villages. Nor did he despatch a mawālī such as Muslim
b. Yassir, a ḥaḍār of whom we actually know that he participated in Ibn al-
Ash'ath's revolt and who supposedly lived to regret his participation, not
because al-Hajjāj retaliated by turning him into a Nabataean, but because
his prestige among his Basran peers was diminished by it118. It could of
 course still be true that Sulaymān allowed the peasant converts of Basra to
come back, but it seems more likely that the whole story was engendered by
the mention (in the original version) of exiles being allowed back. Abū Mūk-
naf did not remember Sulaymān and Ya'qūb b. al-Muhallab as fiscal reform-
ers119; the appointment of the mawālī Sālīh b. 'Abd Allāh b. Yūsuf al-
Muhallab120; and the taxes of Iraq is not a sign of reformist attitudes to clients (the post had pre-
viously been held by Ya'qūb b. Abi Muslim, a client of al-Hajjāj121); and pe-
asant converts were still being refused entry when 'Umar II took over, at
least in Egypt and Khurasan.

As Sulaymān had dismissed the governors of al-Walīd, so 'Umar II dis-
missed those of Sulaymān, once again without displaying a clear preference
for Yemenis122. He called a halt to the campaign against Constanti

116 For mawālī, see the preceding note; for Ya'qūb b. Abi Muslim, see above, note 50.
117 For other Qaysi governors of his, see Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 269.
fī l-ta'rīkh, ed. C. D. Turner, Leiden 1851–74, vol. v, p. 373; Lévi-Provençal,
122 Tabari, II, p. 1306. See also Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 261ff. For Abī Mūkna's story is probably fictitious (Essener, Sulaiman, p. 76).
123 For Sālīh, see the preceding note; for Ya'qūb b. Abi Muslim, see above, note 50.
124 For other Qaysi governors of his, see Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 269.
'Umar's unusual policy was neither Yemeni nor Qaysi, but rather peculiar to 'Umar himself.

Whether he had peculiar policies in respect of muraḍi is more difficult to say. He is reputed to have taken a dim view of intermarriage with them (118), but he employed them in their normal roles, including that of governor of North Africa; and he is credited with ruling that Arab and non-Arab Muslims were to receive the same stipends as the latter were freeborn, that of free men continuing to be lower (119). He certainly reversed al-Hajjāj's policy in respect of runaway dhimmis, as a clear from his fiscal edict (120) and several stories showing the policy in action (121): their conversion was accepted, indeed encouraged, and those desirous of military service were enrolled in the dawān. Once again, however, one may ask what was Yemeni about this policy? It is not attested for previous Yemeni governors, and was not, according to one story, in accordance with the wishes of the Yemeni Jarrah; and when 'Umar dismissed him, he chose a Qaysi for the fiscal administration.

Sulaymān, then, did not pursue the policies that Shaban identifies as Yemeni whereas 'Umar did pursue these policies without there being anything Yemeni about them (122). The idea that there was continuity between the reigns of Sulaymān and 'Umar II does have advocates in the sources (123); one informant even claims that Sulaymān never took any decision without consulting 'Umar first, which obviously cannot be right given the latter's disapproval of Sulaymān's governors (124). The alleged continuity seems to be a mere rationalization of Sulaymān's unexpected choice of 'Umar as his successor (125), and this is certainly what it is in Shaban. Shaban effectively conceives that Sulaymān was a Yemeni only in the sense that he dismissed two Qaysis by descent and replaced them with an Azd; the policies were unchanged or, as Shaban puts it, Sulaymān is an "ambiguous figure." But, he says, Sulaymān's choice of 'Umar II as his heir "strongly tempts us to view him as a very cautious Yaman supporter." (126). Why set 'Umar II's first act was to jail Yazid b. al-Muhāḍab al-Azdī, "an acknowledged leader of the Yaman", but this, we are told, was really a Yemeni act in disguise because his own Yemeni policies were so radical that even Yazid might not go along with them: Yazid's arrest was "a precautionary measure". 'Umar II also replaced Yazid with a Yemeni belonging to the school of al-Hajjāj, but this too was really a declaration of anti-Hajjājite policies in disguise, for in order to implement his Yemeni vision he was prepared to appoint men of that school when they possessed the right qualities (127). Shaban's reasoning, then, is that a) Sulaymān's traditional policies must have been unusual because he designated 'Umar II as his successor; (b) 'Umar II's unusual policies must have been Yemeni because Sulaymān had relied on an Azd; (c) therefore both must have pursued a Yemeni policy that had nothing to do with tribal groups; (d) all contradictory evidence can be explained away with a bit of imaginative effort (128).

Shaban's imaginative efforts are visible on every page on his books, but his treatment of Yazid b. al-Muhāllab is as good an illustration as any of his method. Yazid's father, al-Muhullab, was a participant in the early conquests who supported Ibn al-Zubayr in the Second Civil War, assumed command of the campaigns against the Azurqa, switched to the Umayyads when the Zubayrids were defeated, suppressed the Azurqa on behalf of 'Abd al-Malik and was rewarded with the governorship of Kharūs, where he died and was succeeded by Yazid (129). Yazid thus rose in the service of al-Hajjāj, who was married to one of his sisters (130). The amicable relations between them came to an end when al-Hajjāj dismissed Yazid from Khurās and relatives of his from other offices in the East for reasons unknown: the sources conjecture that Yazid had made himself unpopular in Kharūs, even among his own Azdī, or that he has behaved in an 'asabi fashion by only sending the Mudarī captains from Ibn al-Asīhāth's revolt to al-Hajjāj, setting free the Yemenis, or that he had embezzled money or that al-Hajjāj was acting on a premonition (131). According to Shaban, Yazid was dis...

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119) Judd, al-ʿArab, p. 212.
123) Cf. Eisenber, Sulaimān, p. 81; add de Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 17; Sulaymān began his reign by doing good and ended it by doing good, i.e. by appointing 'Umar, so he came to be known as muḥākb al-khayrāb.
124) Abu Zor'a, Tarīkh, no. 123.
126) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 130.
128) For a similar approach to the caliphates of Sulaymān and 'Umar II, see 'A. M. al-Khaṭīb, Al-bāḥr al-anwār fī Khurāsān, Baghdad and Beirut, 1975 (in which Shaban is not cited). His postulates are rightly rejected by Eisenber, (Sulaimān, p. 84n).
129) EL, s.v. ʿal-Muhāllab b. Abī Sufyān.
130) According to Dixon, however, he only married her shortly before Yazid's dismissal in order to hide his intentions (Umayyad Caliphate, p. 117).
131) Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, p. 117.
missed because he was a well-known leader of the Yaman in the political sense of that word, for all that Yazid had never said or done anything to suggest that he had anti-expansionist or pro-assimilationalist views\(^{134}\). Dismissal in the Marwânid period customarily meant imprisonment, demands for the return of wealth embezzled and torture to facilitate repayment\(^ {135}\); this was the treatment that al-Hajjâj meted out to Yazid, divorcing his Muhallabid wife in the process. Yazid, however, managed to escape from jail and flee to Palestine, which had a substantial Aqzî population and which was governed by Sulaymân, the heir-apparent. Through his Aqzî connections he could get to Sulaymân and through Sulaymân he could get to the caliph. This is how things worked out: Sulaymân persuaded al-Walid to grant Yazid amân from al-Hajjâj. He was safe as long as Sulaymân could protect him\(^ {136}\).

Now al-Walid I wanted to designate his own son as successor at the expense of Sulaymân and received support for this enterprise from his governors al-Hajjâj and Qutayba\(^ {137}\). Sulaymân and Yazid thus acquired common enemies: if Sulaymân succeeded, al-Hajjâj and Qutayba were bound to be dispossessed and Yazid was bound to replace them. Since al-Walid I died prematurely, Sulaymân did succeed. Al-Hajjâj had died in the meantime and Qutayba was killed when he tried to rebel, but al-Hajjâj’s relatives were rounded up and subjected to torture by Sâ‘îh b. ‘Abd al-Rahmân, the muqaddas who was appointed to the fiscal administration and whose treatment of al-Hajjâj’s family comes across to Shaban as a “close study of the financial policy of al-Hajjâj”\(^ {138}\). His vengeance accomplished, Yazid went off to display his supposedly anti-imperialist persuasion by conquering Jurjân.

As far as the sources are concerned, then, the Muhallabids and al-Hajjâj’s family fell out over the governorship of Khurasan and ended up on different sides in the network of kinship, friends and other allies which formed around two rival claimants to the throne. The leading men of the two networks were playing for control of the lucrative provinces held at the time by al-Hajjâj and Qutayba, and indeed for their lives: had Sulaymân not acceded, al-Hajjâj’s network would have stayed in power and the Muhallabids would have been back on the rack; conversely, Sulaymân’s accession meant that the network in power was ousted and its members subjected to torture, in some cases to death. Shaban is right that the rivalry cannot be described as a “tribal squabble”, but it has not in fact been described as such for over a hundred years. Wellhausen explicitly rejects Dörpfelt’s contention that al-Walid was allied with the Qaysi tribes and Sulaymân with the Yemenis, a theory that Shaban has now revived with the modification that Qays and Yemen were political parties; and Wellhausen further points out that Sulaymân’s policies were no different from al-Walid’s, thereby anticipating Shaban’s modification as well\(^ {139}\). To Shaban, the only alternative to a tribal squabble is a conflict over policies, but there are other possibilities, and the most appropriate word for the phenomenon would be factionalism. The fact that Marwânid policies were dominated by such factions in no way means that the Arabs were less able to grasp political issues than anyone else in the past\(^ {140}\), or for that matter in the present.

The Muhallabids were favourites of Sulaymân, but not of ‘Umar II, who is said to have disapproved of Yazid’s appointment and to have disliked his entire family\(^ {141}\). This too is probably mere rationalization of later events\(^ {142}\), but at least the events in question are clear: Yazid was once more dismissed, jailed and asked to pay up, and though he was apparently spared the torture this time round, he was paraded on a donkey and threatened with exile to Dâhîl\(^ {143}\). When ‘Umar died, he escaped from jail, not because he disapproved of Yazid II’s Qaysi policies, as Shaban would have it, but because the new caliph was a kinsman of al-Hajjâj’s and therefore bound to exact vengeance for the torture that the Muhallabids had inflicted on the latter’s family\(^ {144}\). Yazid b. al-Muhallab went to Basra and raised a revolt, but did he call for the end of expansion and equal treatment of muqaddas? Of course not. He demanded kitâb al-lâl wa-sunnat al-nabi from the Umayyads, spelling it out as a demand for Iraqi participation in decision-making\(^ {145}\), the departure of the Syrian troops from Iraq and a promise that

\(^{134}\) Shaban, 'Abd al-Malik, p. 128. Yazid is also depicted as an assimilationalist in al-Kharmiti, al-'Ifrig, pp. 178 ff.

\(^{135}\) Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 449 ff; Crone, Slaves, p. 44.

\(^{136}\) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1208 ff; ibid., pp. 1656 ff; EI², s.v. ‘Muhallabids’.

\(^{137}\) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1274 ff; ibid., pp. 222 ff.

\(^{138}\) Shaban, ‘Abd al-Malik, p. 78. For a discussion of why Qutayba rebelled, see Eisener, Sulaiman, p. 91 ff.

\(^{139}\) Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 259–63. Cf. also Eisener, Sulaiman, pp. 83 ff.

\(^{140}\) Cf. P. Crone, Pre-Industrial Societies, Oxford 1989, pp. 60 ff.


\(^{142}\) Cf. Eisener, Sulaiman, pp. 211 ff, on stories in which Sulaymân is used as a foil for ‘Umar II’s piety.

\(^{143}\) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1351 ff; Powers, p. 80 ff; Eisener suggests that Yazid was jailed as a kind of hostage because the Muhallabids had grown in power and ‘Umar II could not take their loyalty for granted (Sulaiman, p. 114).

\(^{144}\) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1359 ff; Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 312 ff; Eisener proposes conjectures of his own (Sulaimân, p. 114 and note 410 thereto).

\(^{145}\) Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1391 ff, 1398 = Powers, pp. 129, 131, with the spelling out at p. 1400 = 321, where Yazid asks his followers, ‘Do you really believe that the Umayyads will act in accordance with the Book and the sunna...? They don’t tell you ‘we accept your conditions’ with the intention of only exercising their authority
al-Hajjaj’s policy would not be reimposed on the Iraqis\(^{114}\). In other words, he adopted an Iraqi cause that he had displayed no interest in so far, having been keen enough on the Umayyads when they gave him appointments and keen enough on Syrian troops as well, having been accused of favoritism towards them when he was governor of Khurasan for Sulayman\(^{115}\). His revolt was opportunistic, but more importantly, the cause he took up was provincial autonomy, not frontier policies or racial issues, though Shaban of course finds it easy enough to blur the distinction\(^{116}\). Shaban is right that the revolt cannot be interpreted as ‘a mere tribal struggle between Yaman and Qays’\(^{117}\), but he is once more hanging on open doors, for the sources do not present it as such and the only modern author to see it as a struggle between Qays-Mudar and Yemen is Shaban himself\(^{118}\). The Muhaalibids did come to be regarded as Yemeni martyrs after their defeat, but it was as Azdite, not as sponsors of ‘Yemeni policies’, that later Yemenis wished to avenge them\(^{119}\).

(iii) Yazid II, Hishām, al-Walid II (721-44).

Little is left of Shaban’s theory by now, but for the sake of completeness we may continue the survey down to the Third Civil War.

Egypt

Yazid II: Bishr b. Saffān al-Kalbi/Yemen
Hanzala b. Saffān al-Kalbi/Yemen
Hishām: Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Malik/Umayyad
al-Jurt b. Yusuf/Umayyad
Hāʃ b. al-Walid al-Ḥadrān/Yemen
‘Abd al-Malik b. Rifi’a al-Fahmi/Qays
al-Walid b. Rifi’a al-Fahmi/Qays

in accordance with your orders and instructions; rather, they [say it] with the intention of appeasing you until they can engage in treachery\(^{a}\). (Powers’s translation is not satisfactory here.)

\(^{115}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1398 = Powers, p. 131.
\(^{116}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1318 = Powers, p. 37; noted by Shaban, ‘Abbasid Revolution, p. 82.
\(^{117}\) Shaban, ‘Abbasid Revolution, p. 94; id., Islamic History, p. 136.
\(^{118}\) Shaban, Islamic History, p. 136.
\(^{119}\) Wellhausen can perhaps be accused of schematizing the tribal alignments (Kingdom, p. 314). But unlike Shaban, he does not present the revolt as being about, or triggered by, the conflict between Qays/Mudar and Yemen.

\(^{114}\) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1858 = Hellenbrand, p. 225.

Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties? 29

‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Khalīd al-Fahmi/Qays
Hanzala b. Saffān al-Kalbi/Yemen
Hāʃ b. al-Walid al-Ḥadrān/Yemen
al-Walid II: Hāʃ b. al-Walid al-Ḥadrān/Yemen\(^{119}\)

North Africa

Yazid II: Yazid b. Abī Muslim, manṣura of al-Hajjaj/Qays\(^{111}\)
Muhammad b. Yazid, manṣura of the Assār or Qaryṣah\(^{112}\)
Rishr b. Saffān al-Kalbi/Yemen
Hishām: Bishr b. Saffān al-Kalbi/Yemen\(^{113}\)
‘Ubaydā b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Sulami/Qays\(^{114}\)
‘Ubaydallāh b. al-Hababah, manṣura of B Shalīl/Qays\(^{115}\)
Kulthum b. ‘Iyād al-Qushayri/Qays\(^{116}\)
Hanzala b. Saffān al-Kalbi/Yemen\(^{117}\)

al-Walid II: none

Iraq

Yazid II: ‘Umar b. Hubayya al-Fazārī/Qays\(^{118}\)
Hishām: Khalīd al-Qasrī/Yemen\(^{119}\)

\(^{110}\) Kindi, Governors, pp. 69-82.
\(^{111}\) Cf. above note 50, 58, 65.
\(^{112}\) Previously governor of North Africa for Sulayman and dismissed by ‘Umar II (above, note 78). Reinstated by the army after the murder of Yazid II (much Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1425 = Powers, p. 185; unknown to Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 231).
\(^{114}\) Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 231; id., Anwaḥ al-‘ubayyif, vol. v, ed. S. D. F. Grotein, Jerusalem 1960, p. 142 (he engaged in ‘raibiyā against Kalb); Ibn ‘Idhārī, Bayān, vol. 1, pp. 396; ‘Yaqūt, Baladān, vol. i, p. 326, s.v. ‘Yanāja‘ (he was a nephew of Abū ‘I Arabia al-Sulami, i.e. a Syriac); Abū ‘I Parajaj al-Iβahān, Khalīf al-qādhī, Cairo 1977-74, vol. ix, p. 313 (he had previously been governor of Uqayna).
\(^{115}\) Ibn ‘Idhārī, Bayān, vol. 1, pp. 51f.; cf. Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 231; ‘Yaqūt, Baladān, vol. i, p. 326, where his name is ‘Abdallāh. He had previously been fiscal governor of Egypt (Kindi, Governors, pp. 73-6; Lathente, Afor, p. 25). According to Ibn ‘Idhārī, he rose to become [military] governor of Egypt, North Africa and Spain alike and appointed his son as Qasrī deputy governor of Egypt; this is unknown to Kindi, though cf. Governors, p. 327.
\(^{118}\) Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 310ff.; Crone, Slaves, p. 107.
\(^{119}\) EF, s.v.
on the advice of a client of B. Shaybân/Rabi‘1, appointed a client of the Umayyads to Shîhâb, a client of his own to (apparently) Nâshâpûr, a client of Layth/Mudar to his hāras, and bestowed favours on a runaway peasant convert who had picked up in the infantry; two clients of his fought for him against al-Hârirî b. Sunayj, one of them a secretary of his who was accompanied by his own shâkirîs, or armed retainers, another client of his fought for him against Abu Muslim; Sâ‘îd al-Saghir, a famous horseman and kâmil of Bâhilah/Qays, likewise supported Nasr, as did a client of Layth/Mudar in charge of the coinage in Iraq who brought him vital information about events in that province.

There was however a change of policy towards runaway peasants in Khurasan, for Ashras al-Sulami/Qays encouraged the dhimmis of Sogdia to convert with promises that their conversion would be accepted; and though he went back on his word when he saw the fiscal implications, the tax system was eventually reformed along ‘Umar II’s lines by Nasr b. Sâyîrâkh. Given that both governors were members of Qays/Mudar, while the Yemeni Asad al-Qa‘i is explicitly said to have penalized converts in Bukhârâ (at the request of the local ruler) and to have ‘seized the necks of’ converts in Mawr, the intensification of the conflict between Qays/Mudar and Yemen in Khurasan can hardly reflect disagreement over the admission of converts, unless we are to take it that the parties had switched stances.

106] Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1661; Jahâshiyyat, Fuzûl, p. 66f. (adds that the manûla later became Naṣr’s secretary and was killed by Abu Muslim.)
109] Cf. below, note 196.
110] Cronen, Slaves, p. 53, on Yûnus b. ‘Abd Rabîh.
113] Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1920 = Williams, p. 32, where he returns to Mawr with Jarrain, along with other Mudaris supporters of Naṣr; cf. ii, p. 1599 (manûla of Bâhilah, fâris).

128] For the governors of Iraq, see Cronen, Slaves, appendix III, nos. 65–122. For illustrative examples relating to Khurasan, see Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1529, 1664.
129] Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1458 = Powers, p. 188.

132] Bev., s.v.

Yûsuf b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays
al-Walid II: Yûsuf b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays

Khorasan
Yazid II: Sâ‘îd Khudhayna/Quaysh
Sâ‘îd al-Harashi/Qays
Sû‘îd al-Kâhil/Qays
Memûn b. Sû‘îd al-Kâhil/Qays

Hisâm: Asad b. ‘Abd al-Qa‘i/Qays/Yemen
A‘shas b. ‘Abdallâh al-Sulami/Qays
Mu‘a‘aîn b. ‘Abd al-Rahîm al-Murri/Qays
‘A‘sim b. ‘Abdallâh al-Hillâh/Qays
Asad al-Qa‘i/Yemen
Naṣr b. Sayyâr al-Kânî/Mudar
al-Walid II: Naṣr b. Sayyâr al-Kânî/Mudar

Yemeni governors predominate in the West, Qaysi/Mudar ones in the East, but the pattern is mixed in both regions. It is not however mixed when we consider the appointments made by the governors themselves, for in Iraq and Khurasan the governors were now so conscious of the rivalry between Qays/Mudar and Yemen that all relied overwhelmingly or exclusively on members of their own descent group.

As regards expansion, however, there was plainly no disagreement over the need to continue the conquest of Central Asia, which continued under the ‘Abbâısids too for all the latter were ‘Yemenis’ in Shâhân’s view.

As regards mawâlî, they continued to dominate the bureaucracy and to proliferate within the army, from where they rose to increasingly important posts regardless of the supposed political convictions of the caliphs or their governors: the Qaysi ‘Umar b. Hûbâyra appointed a client of Bâhilah/Qays to Kirmân (which the client resented, having hoped for a better province), while the ‘right-wing Mudarî Naṣr b. Sâyîrâkh is constantly seen in the company of his own and other people’s clients, though never those of the Yemenis: he turned down an offer of the governorship of Bukhârâ.
Non-militant Khurasanis!

In general, it must be said that Shaban’s anti-imperialism is an implausible ideal in a society so unashamedly militant as that of the early Muslims. Expansion was divinely enjoined (jihād177), death in battle against infidels was martyrdom rewarded by Paradise178, and the attributes of warriors were greatly admired whether people had their minds on Paradise or not. Men were praised as “youths who grew up amidst the fires of war and accomplished noble deeds before their beards began to grow”179; boasting took the form of “the Qahšān were smiting the head of every full-armed warrior”180; and when someone gave the poet al-Pararadaq a blunt sword so that he failed to cut off the head of a Byzantine prisoner despite repeated attempts, everyone laughed, except presumably the prisoner181. It was not a culture in which one would expect to encounter a pacifist ideal, and if such an ideal had in fact been conceived, it would have required a great deal of thought for its justification; but of such thought there is no trace.

The pacifist vision is particularly implausible in a Khurasani setting, for one would hardly expect non-militancy to flourish in a frontier province under constant threat of invasion; and in fact, Shaban’s presentation rests on high-handed treatment of the sources. When Qutayba presented himself as the best of lights to his troops in order to persuade them to rebel with him, he reminded them of how little interest his predecessors had taken in campaigns, obviously expecting them to find his own very different behaviour as laudable as his regular payment of stipends, of which he reminded them too. Shaban nonetheless claims that it was for his ceaseless campaigning that he was killed182. When Yazid II appointed the Umayyad Sa’id b. ‘Abd al-Azz to Khurasan, the troops found him to be “a soft and easy man who lived in comfort and luxury” and nicknamed him Khudhayna, loosely translatable as ‘housewife’183; they taunted him as “the effeminate one of Quraysh” and satirized him in poetry as a woman equipped with mirror, comb, kohl containers, incense burners and musical instruments, as opposed to “a full court of mail composed of double rings and a sharp sword fashioned to cut”; they also complained directly of his inactivity, telling him that “the fact that you are no longer carrying out military expeditions has allowed the Turks to take the offensive and caused the Sogdians to renounce Islam”184. In Shaban’s summary all this comes out as “Sa’id Khudhayna does not seem to have deviated much from the policy of ‘Umar II…his campaigning policy…was certainly not expansionist”185. The supposedly pacifist Khurasanis also accused their next governor, Sa’id al-Harashi/Qays, of cowardice, this time because he rejected a muwāla’s advice to attack the Sogdians at Khijanda186; and when his successor, Muslim b. Sa’id al-Kilāb/Qays sent a delegation of Khurasanis to Iraq in connection with a dispute over money, the Khurasani spokesman Mūtzn b. Jibrīl (presumably a muwāla) told the governor ‘Umar b. Hubayra/Qaṣī that “We live on a frontier where we fight against an enemy that is constantly at war. We wear iron so often that rust sticks to our skin; indeed, the smell of iron causes a female servant to turn her face away from her master and from other men that she serves. You, on the other hand, stay at home, adorning yourselves in fine clothes dyed with saffron”, meaning that Ibn Hubayra lived too soft a life to appreciate the needs of warriors, not that the warriors resented his Qaysi policy of expansion187. Twelve years later, according to Shaban, Hilāsh nonetheless decided to “yield to the forces of assimilation” and to drop about half of the war-weary Khurasanis from the du‘a‘im, supposedly telling his governor Junayd al-Murri/Qays to “enlist [only] 15,000 men because enlistment is purposeless to you”, a strange statement. What he actually said was fa-frid fa-lā ghayyata laqa fi l-farida li-khamsa tuhara al-farāna, which obviously means “recruit; there is no limit for you in the recruitment of 15,000 [men]”, or in other words “you may recruit 15,000 men or more”. Shaban has taken ghayta to mean ‘purpose’ rather than ‘housewife’.

177) Cf. al-Pararadaq on events in Khurasan in 96: “Men for Islam who, as soon as they fought for religion, caused it to spread in every place” (Tabari, ii, p. 1305 = Powers, p. 20).
178) For Khurasani commanders reminding their troops of this, see Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1422, 1424 = Powers, pp. 153, 155.
180) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1308 = Powers, p. 27. Al-Tabari’s chronicle abound in poetry of this kind.
182) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1287 = Powers, p. 9; cf. 1298 = 12 (“God has conquered the lands for you and made your roads secure”); Shaban, Islamic History, p. 128.
186) Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1443 = Powers, pp. 173ff. The muwāla was al-Fadl b. Basām, on whom see below, note 196.
188) Islam LXXI, No 2.
than 'limit', shifted the words around and ignored al-Baladurî's version, in
which Hishâm al-‘ājaza ṣuwakba fi ʿd-farrāḍa fā-farrāqā li-khamasa ʿasabha al-f
rajul, "gave him a free hand in respect of recruitment, so he recruited 15,000
men". There is no question of dropping men from the diwān here. The
context is the aftermath of the Battle of the Pass: severe losses had been
suffered, 20,000 men were despatched from Iraq and the governor was told
to recruit as many men as he wanted in Khurasan.

Shaban’s pacific ideal is not just implausible, but also gratuitous: why
should assimilation have been incompatible with a desire for conquest? Shi-
ban’s implicit answer is that Arab tribesmen were warriors whereas non-
Arab non-tribesmen were peasants and traders and thus bound, where they
prevailed, to deprive the former of their warlike inclinations.388. But though
Arab tribesmen were indeed warriors endowed with the habit of branding
all non-Arabs as peasants and traders, it does not follow that all non-Arabs
were peaceful civilians in actual fact; and though the tribal organisation of
the Arabs was indeed being eroded, the Arabs did not automatically
become pacifists thereby. History is not lacking in examples of war-
like non-tribesmen: the ethos of the Sassanian empire had been militant
enough, and the ethos of soldiers tends to be martial wherever they are
found. Is it likely that Arab soldiers should have conceived a desire to trade
or cultivate when they began to hobnob with Iranian soldiers? Are we to
take it that the runaway peasants who clamoured for entrance in the army
wanted to get out of it again as soon as they learnt Arabic, or that the Yeme-
nis who so nobly sponsored the converts’ right to membership of the diwān
resented their own membership of this institution? If Arab and Iranian sol-
diers got to know each other in the army, one would expect the end-product
to have been assimilated soldiers, and so of course it was. The Yemenis who
ended up (along with numerous Muḥājrīn) in the imperial troops of the
‘Abbāsid caliphate evidently were not would-be traders inconvenienced by war-
fare, and the maṣūlī soldiers of Khurasan were as militant as their Arab counter-
parts, though Shaban is not of course prepared to admit it. When Hāyān
al-Nabātī, who had commanded the maṣūlī unit in Qutayba’s army, is dis-
cussed as advising the effeminate governor Sa‘d Khudhayr to attack the
Sogdians during a campaign, Shaban gratuitously credits the maṣūlī with a
desire for plunder and further writes him off as “a representative of the
dahlāqīn of Marw” (who also had an interest in preventing assimilation):

388 Shaban, ‘Abbāsid Revolution, p. 116; Tabari, ser. ii. p. 1545; Baladhurî,
Fatḥ, p. 429; v. Crone, Slaves, note 266, where this point was first made.

389 Compare Ahmad b. Ḥānjaj, p. 346, where it is al-Ḥānjaj’s desire to restore
a warlike spirit to ‘Uzā and Basra that causes him to repatriate peasants converts.

Hāyān was an advocate of constant campaigning who realized that “the
continuation of ‘Umar II’s policy... was going to lead eventually to the
destruction of his own class”.389 Hāyān was in fact a prisoner-of-war from
Dāyān (though some did hold him to be from Khurasan),390 a devout Mus-
lim in so far as one can tell,391 and the father of a religious scholar who
converted infidels at Kābul after flecing there from Abū Muslim.392 The
maṣūlī who advised Sa‘d al-Ḥarashi to attack should presumably also be
considered as a representative of the dahlāqīn of Marw in Shaban’s opinion,
though his father was in fact a prisoner-of-war from Sīṭān,393 while he and
his various relatives and clients were highly respected members of the Khu-
rasan army in the period from Qutayba to Naṣr b. Sayyār,394 whom they
evertheless deserted to fight on Abū Muslim’s side in the revolution.395 If
anybody was in league with dahlāqīn it was Asad al-Qasri, Shaban’s Yemeni
hero of whom we are explicitly told that the dahlāqīn of Khurasan escorted

al-Sam‘āni erroneously infers from his source that he came from Iraq (al-
389 Tabari, ser. ii. pp. 1291 (where his pieté articulates selfish interests), 1430
(where it does not) = Powers, pp. 15, 162.
390 On whom, see J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert
391 Ibn Ḥajar, Taqādum, v. p. 278; compare Tabari, ser. ii, p. 998 = Wil-
liams, p. 105, where he leads the resistance against the Musawwida. He had also
been an opponent of al-Ḳirmānī (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1390 = Williams, p. 41).
392 Tārikh-i Sīṭān, tr. M. Gold, Rome 1976, p. 14; Baladhurî, Fatḥ, p. 393, on
Bassām, maṣūlī of Ibn ‘Umar al-Laythī.
393 Ibn Bassām al-Laythī was in Qutayba’s service (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1222 =
Hinds, p. 108); Al-Ḥajjān b. Bassām, possibly the same man and possibly a brother,
at all events the man whose advice was ignored by al-Ḥarashi (above, note 186), was
among the maṣūlī known for their insight into Khurasani warfare (Tabari, ser. ii. p.
1544); the family had maṣūlī of their own, at least one of whom also rose to promi-
nence (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1444 = Powers, p. 174). ‘Abaydallāh b. Bassām was a friend
of Naṣr b. Sayyār, of whose farm he was in charge and on whose side he fought
63, 208, 226; Williams, p. 34); Ibrahim b. Bassām commanded 10,000 men under
Junayd al-Murri (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1532) and fought with Naṣr against al-Ḫurīṭ as
late as 128/7451 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1297 = Williams, p. 38).
394 ‘Usbāy ibn b. Bassām joined even though he had influential with Naṣr b.
Sayyār (Abkar al-dawla: ʿAbbāsidage, ed. ‘A.-‘A. al-Dīrī and ‘A.-J. al-Muṭṭalib,
Beirut 1971, p. 233); Bassām b. Ibrahim [b. Bassām] also began in Naṣr’s service.
395 Islām LXXI, II, 1
him to Iraq on his dismissal for *qabadna* in 109 A.H.[199] but naturally Shaban knows better: the *dahaqin* mentioned here were not *dahaqin* but rather Indian, princes with whom Asad had sought an alliance in order to promote his pacifist vision and for the safety of which he had been dismissed.[199]

The only evidence Shaban adduces in support of Khurasani and other war-wealthiness is complaint of *tajmir*, keeping the troops too long in the field and *takhalluf*, failure to appear when called up. No soldiers liked being kept away from their homes for too long, whatever too long might be: presumably keeping the troops in the field beyond the summer months was *tajmir*: whoever ordered the troops to cultivate was certainly guilty of it, this being the order issued by al-Hajaj to his Peacock Army in Sistan and by Sulayman to his troops in India and Anatolia[200]. At all events, *tajmir* was certainly an issue in the Umayyad period; even the rebels against 'Uthmân are alleged to have complained of it[201]; indeed, 'Umar I foresaw the problem and warned against it[202]. The complaint does not seem to be encountered in a Khurasani context, but this could well be accidental. It should however be obvious that those who made it, wherever and whenever they may have been, did not thereby protest against expansion, only against the

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[201] See for example Tabari, *sir ii*, pp. 902f. = Rowson, p. 54, where a thousand men are called up from each of the quarters in Kufa; cf. also ibid., p. 856 = Rowson, p. 4, where al-Mu'ammal is allowed to pick the best Kufans for his troops.

[202] Under Ziyâd b. Abîhi, the Kufans were called up every year or every second year, depending on where they were registered for service (Juda, al-'Arab, p. 224, citing a somewhat enigmatic passage in Baladshari, *Abed*, vol. i, p. 173); but one does not get the impression that the Iraqis (let alone the Medines) were called up with such regularity under the Marwânids.


[205] Differently the caliph Hishâm, who was allegedly so fond of restoring stipends to combatants that he would hand his own stipends plus an extra dirham to the client who acted as his substitute on campaigns (thus Tabari, *sir ii*, p. 1732 = Hillenbrand, p. 74).

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the time of Mu’awiya or the Second Civil War onwards in Syria\(^{200}\), Iraq\(^{201}\), Medina\(^{202}\) and Khorasan\(^{203}\). Even the pre-Islamic Meccans are supposed to have engaged in the practice of sending substitutes!\(^{204}\) The Muslim habit

\(^{200}\) Bonner, ‘Ja’ā’il’, pp. 471, citing N. Nödeke (ed.), Delectus Carminum Arabicorum, Wiesbaden 1933, p. 77, and other sources for a poets by a Syrian Shiaq b. Sdkyk al-Asadi called up for a campaign in Khorasan in the 30s. Elsewhere, however, the story is set in the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1029, on Shiaq b. Salit al-Asadi). In the Second Civil War al-Hajjaj reputedly burnt the houses of Syrians who failed to turn up for a campaign against Mu’ayyab (Ibn ‘Abd Rabbihi, ‘Iqd, vol. iv, p. 410). In 69 the Syrians takhallu’f on al-phræs, w’ur ‘Abd al-Malik deducted a fifth of their property from their stipends in 70 (Khaliil, Thādiq, pp. 336, 337). Nisām did not pay stipends to the Marwānids unless they actually fought, so some fought, some performed non-military services in the diwan and some sent substitutes (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1782 = Hillenbrand, p. 74).


\(^{202}\) An army raised by al-Asdaq, apparently in Medina, in the reign of Yazid I for an expedition against Ibn al-Zahraw in Mecca consisted mostly of budāli’ min al-qawāṣim al-salafīyah and sympathizers of Ibn al-Zahraw (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. ivb, p. 24, line 14; wrongly placed in the reign of ‘Uthmān in Bonner, ‘Ja’ā’il’, p. 47); or the army had been raised in Syria and consisted largely of clients of the Umayyads and people who were not members of the diwan (Baladhuri, op. cit., p. 25, line 16; cf. Tabari, ser. ii, p. 324). When 2900 Medinees were mobilized in 88, they tejā’ al-lāli and went 1500, while 500 stayed behind (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 192 = Hinds, p. 141). In 106 Hijrīn raised troops during his pilgrimage for a summer campaign against the Byzantines in 107, fa-qad kufru’u... ‘alā ‘l-jār al-‘alif’ (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1487f.). Cf. also above, note 208.


of writing the present into the past is nothing if not thoroughgoing. It is also enduring, for the twenty-century Shabib presents the defaults of the Umayyad period as conscientious objectors: passive resistance to the imperialist policies of the Qays/Mudar party was the only weapon left to them\(^{205}\). Now of the future Khārijī Shabib b. Yazid we are told that his father married Kufa to Mosul, where Shabib was enrolled in the disīvin on reaching adolescence; under the influence of a preacher, however, he turned ascetic and began to abstain himself, among other things to go on pilgrimage; due to his frequent absence his name was eventually removed from the list, which he regretted and tried to rectify without success, whereupon he joined the Khārijī Salāḥ b. Musarrīb\(^{206}\). Are we to take it that the adolescent Shabib practised takhallu’f as a conscientious objector to Umayyad imperialism and decided to re-enrol on reaching the more mature conviction that imperialism was right after all? Obviously not. The story says that Shabib was an adolescent drifter whose pay was cut off, whereupon he wanted to sign up again and turned rebellious when he failed. The story may be true or false, but this is how takhallu’f was perceived by those who saw it in action. “I will cut off the head of any man who fails to turn up within three days of taking his stipenda,” as al-Hajjaj announced on one occasion\(^{207}\); “you have taken your stipends, so join your commander”, as Naṣr b. Sayyār told the defectors at Barīqān\(^{208}\); membership of the diwan was a source of income that people were reluctant to forgo. When Yazid b. -
Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties? 41

The Third Civil War

The only suggestion that Qays/Mudar and Yemen might be associated with different political visions comes in the Third Civil War, more precisely in the enthronement speech of Yazid II, the candidate of the Yamanites. Yazid III promised not to engage in building programmes or the digging of canals, not to accumulate wealth on behalf of his wives and children, not to transfer money from one province to another unless there was a surplus, and then only to provinces in need, not to keep troops in the fields for too long, not to deprive his subjects of his attention, not to overtax their jizya-payers to the point where they would flee from the land, but on the contrary to pay stipends regularly whether the recipients be far away or near at hand, and to step down if he failed to abide by his promise or a better candidate was found.

Shaban, this was an anti-expansionist and pro-assimilationist programme. But Yazid said nothing whatever about the end of expansion, only about the end of tax. Nor did he say anything about relations between Arabs and mawsi: his promise to pay stipends regularly to subjects far and wide obviously was not a promise to pay them to Arabs and non-Arabs alike. And his abdication of the pay rise granted by al-Walid II to the Syrians obviously did not signal an intention to end the Syrian privilege/duty to provide imperial troops!

Who was going to use in that role! Shaban’s idea that the provinces could be left to police themselves is strangely naive and all the odder in that he surely must have noticed that, his ‘Yemen’ ‘Abbasids merely replaced the Syrians with Khurasanis.

It is nonetheless a fact that there is a political programme in Yazid’s speech, as there is in his letters to the Iraqis promising government in accordance with kibāb and sunna and referring to his own election by

domestic as that of al-Hajjāj; and it was asd al-Qasari/Yemen who wanted the soldiers of Khurasan to swear that their wives would be divorced if they were to respond to their mobilisation orders by placing substitutes or failing to turn up.

Shaban, Islamic History, p. 155f.
The programme is directed against imperialism in the sense of absolutism, not that of expansionism or racialism: the stress is on fairness, consultation and deference to the wishes of the community. But the programme is more likely to reflect Yazid III’s Qadari convictions than his Yemeni associations, and this is the one and only occasion on which a convergence between Qadariism and Yemenism is attested. The Yemeniyya needed a programme for the obvious reason that one could not start killing caliphs without offering a reasoned account of what one was doing and why, and Yazid’s ideas must have made sense to them, and indeed to many others as well. But the Yemeniyya did not refer to these ideas in the poetry with which they celebrated their victory, nor did they use them as programmatically stated in their subsequent battles with Marwan’s Qaysiyya, and one certainly cannot use them as the key to the antagonism between Qays/Mudar and Yemen from beginning to end.

Starting again: the premises

All in all, then, Shaban’s thesis is implausible and based on a remarkably tendentious reading of the sources. What then be said about the phenomenon in positive terms? We may start with three basic observations.

First, the antagonism between Qays/Mudar and Yemen was a military phenomenon. We hear of it in connection with governors, generals, soldiers and their diverse appointees, not in connection with traders, craftsmen or peasants. The rivalry divided ahl al-Shāb, ahl al-Khurasān and so on in the sense of the Syrian and Khurasani troops, not the populations of Syria or Khurasan in general. Now as mentioned already, it was difficult for tribal groups such as Sa’d or Hudaiyda, or alone larger units such as Tamin or Azd to take collective action because they were widely dispersed over the Islamic lands and highly differentiated even within a single province; the tribal organization of the conquerors had been subject to a process of erosion from the moment they settled in the conquered lands. But it was not impossible for such groups within the same area to behave as units, or for such groups within different armies to act together when they came in contact with each other, as they did wherever the Syrians had to cooperate with local troops. The armies were after all divided into tribal regiments which could gang up in accordance with their real or supposed genealogical relationship if this was perceived to be in their interest. The key question is that the interests were.

Secondly, the rivalry was first and foremost a provincial phenomenon. The caliphs appointed governors of both Qays/Mudar and Yemen till the end of the Umayyad period, but their governors increasingly restricted themselves to one or the other descent group when they appointed sub-governors in their turn, or so at least in the east. The factionalism clearly affected the caliphs, but it was not until the Third Civil War that it engulfed the Syrian metropolis. What we are looking for, then, is provincial interests open to transformation into metropolitan aims.

Thirdly, the rivalry took the form of ‘asabiyya. People were born into one group or the other and defended their ghom for the simple reason that it was their own, without there being any ideological dimension to the rivalry before it culminated in civil war. To repeat, then, the most appropriate term for the phenomenon would be factionalism. It is a fatal mistake to explain factionalism by supplying the participants with supposed programmes which they themselves failed to articulate, for it is a distinguishing feature of factional behaviour that it is not open to rationalisation in ideological terms; when ideology creeps into it (as it obviously can), the behavioural patterns change. The absence of programmes is a clue that we should follow up, not a deficiency that we should try to remedy, and its message is surely that the participants were too similar in terms of social, cultural and political background for different visions and aspirations to be involved in their hostilities: some were sons of X and some were sons of Y, or, in different imagery, some were greens and some were blues, some were Mounteagles and some were Capulets. The participants were men of the same kind striving for the same aims, yet provincial interests of this kind or another divided them into opposing groups along lines that have an arbitrary appearance because they did not articulate substantive differences. This takes us back to the question of what the interests were.

Thus far the premises: how one should proceed will no doubt remain a matter of dispute. My own interpretation of the phenomenon was presented fourteen years ago, and I do not have much to add to it now; but my original presentation cannot be described as user-friendly, and I shall accordingly restate the argument in a hopefully more intelligible manner here.

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219 Crone and M. Hinds, God’s Caliph, Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam, Cambridge 1986, p. 68
221 Powers brings this out well by consistently translating abd as ‘troops’ in military contexts.
The Sufyânid background

As regards the Sufyânid period, there seems to be general agreement on two points: first, politics were genuinely tribal; and secondly, the tribal alignments were different from those that we encounter in the Marwânid period.

That Sufyânid politics were tribal obviously does not mean that they were about nothing (as Shaban’s expression “tribal squabbles” might be taken to suggest). A tribe is simply a group of a particular kind, and politics are tribal when people pursue their interests through groups of this kind rather than others, such as factions, political parties, churches, classes, nations or whatever. In Sufyânid Syria the interest of the tribes lay in gaining access to, and influence with, the caliph, the ultimate decision-maker, and the story of their competition for this access is well known.232) Mu‘awiya was allied with the Syrian tribe known as Kaib, which in its turn was allied with many other Syrian tribes; and all the alliances, who were collectively known as the Qudâ’i, achieved a highly privileged position. The chief of the Kaib, who was also the chief of the Qudâ’i, had extracted a promise from Mu‘awiya (endorsed by Yazid I) that in return for his cooperation he and other Qudâ’i should be consulted in all decisions made by the caliph, that they should have the right to propose and veto measures, and that 2000 members of the confederacy should receive stipends of 2000 dinars a year (i.e. sharef al-tâbil) on a heri-cotobary basis.233) Members of this chiefly house were appointed to high office in Syria under Mu‘awiya and Yazid, the son of the Kalbian woman that Mu‘awiya married by way of sealing the alliance234). The non-Qudâ’i tribes of Syria were thus left with the choice between trying to gain membership of Qudâ’i and trying to ostracize them, and the period was marked by intense discussion of possible genealogical alliances among tribes such as Jâshâni235), ‘Amilâ236) and

232 See for example Dixon, Unasayed Cilphate, pp. 83 ff.
234 Crone, Slaves, p. 93 ff.
235) The Syrian tribe of Jâshâni was held by some to be sons of Qanas b. Ma‘a‘d, by others to be sons of Asada b. Khuwayma (brother of Asad), a descendant of Nizâr b. Ma‘add; and by most to be of Qahâl (Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Ibar ‘alâ qabîl’i’l-râvâh, Cairo 1850, pp. 104 ff.). In the Sufyânid period, Râwâh b. Zîbâ al-Jâshâni supported the affiliation of his tribe to Asad (Asadâli) (al-Baladaburi, Asâbî as-suhrî, vol. i, ed. M. Hamidallah, 1959, pp. 361); or he supported its affiliation to Ma‘add, telling Yazid that they were a Syrian rather than a Yemeni tribe and ought to be joined to their Ma‘addi brothers, i.e. Qudâ’i (Ibn Asâkî, vol. ix, p. 314; note

237) Apparently Kinds237). Hims was the centre of genuine South Arabian tribes (i.e. tribes which indisputably lived in South Arabia before the conquest, as opposed to tribes which merely claimed to have done so after adopting Yemeni descent), notably Himyar and Hamdân; and these tribes identified themselves as Yemenis in opposition to the Qudâ’i. According to Caskel, the collective name of Qahâl was first adopted by them, though this is somewhat conjectural238). At all events, northern Syria and the Jazira were meanwhile filling up with immigrants from North Arabia who went together under the name of Qays and who became so numerous that Qinnsar was detached from Hims to become a jund of its own239); the Jazira being detached from Qinnsar soon thereafter240); and these tribesmen were also keen to oust the Qudâ’i from their privileged position: “we will never pay allegiance to the son of a Kalbian woman”, as they said when Mu‘awiya arranged for the succession of Yazid 1241). When Yazid died prematurely in 683, the Qays supported the candidature of Ibn al-Zubayr, or more precisely Ibn al-Zubayr’s Syrian representative al-Dâhâbî b. Qays al-Fihri. Genuine South Arabsians such as the Himyaretics in Hims also opted for Ibn al-Zubayr, as did more recent members of the Yemeni bloc such as the Ansâr in Hims and the Jâshâni in Palestine242) along with “the majority that two Asâd are enumerated along with Ma‘add and Nizâr in the Numa inscription, cf. I. Shahid, Byzantium and the Arabs in the Fourth Century, Washington 1984, p. 31 ff.). His rival, Nâbil b. Qays al-Jâshâni, backed the ultimately dominant affiliation to Qahâl (Crone, Slaves, p. 34; Caskel, Gamhara, vol. p. 53 ff., where Caskel ignores his own view that the Qudâ’i were Ma‘addis at the time; cf. also H. Lammens, ‘Le Caliphat de Yazid (suite)’, Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale de l’Université de Saint-Joseph 5 (1912), p. 69 ff.).
238) The ‘Amilâ and Lakhm counted as brothers of Judhân and thus achieved the same Qahâl genealogy (cf. Caskel, Gamhara, vol. ii, p. 53 ff.); but the ‘Amilâ are said by some to have been descendants of Qudâ’i (Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Fihân, p. 103).

239) For Kinda’s Ma‘addi genealogy, see Crone, Slaves, note 243.
240) Caskel, Gamhara, vol. i, p. 34.
241) According to Sayraf b. ‘Umar, the jund of Qinnsar was established by Mu‘awiya to respond to the influx of refugees from ‘All’s Iraq (Tabari, ser. 1, p. 2073); according to Baladaburi, Fihân, p. 122; it was established by Yazid I; and according to the Andalusi Abu ‘Abd al-Mukhtar’s revolt (Laurent, Ajar, p. 56). It is the second claim that I am sure to be correct. 242) EF², n.s. ‘Dzjarra’.
of the Yemenis in Damascus (243); and the Quda'a never did (244). But
the Quda'a naturally wanted the Umayyad dynasty to continue and eventually
settled for Marwan, on condition that he granted them the same
privileges that they had enjoyed under the Saffiyyids (245); and when the two
parties met in battle at Marj Rahit in 684, the Quda'a and their Kindi allies
defeated the Qays and Qahlan despite the latter's numerical superiority.

Once more, then, the throne was occupied by an Umayyad caliph allied
with the Quda'a. But the restoration was accompanied by a major genea-
logical reshuffle, for shortly after the battle of Marj Rahit the Quda'a joined
the Qahlan confederacy, thereby generating the Yemeni group that we
encounter in Marwanid times.

The Quda'a counted as sons of Ma'addi, both of pre-Islamic and early Islamic
times (246). Ma'addi was a northern tribe which is mentioned in the Nemes
inscription and Greek sources (247); and the Kalb, the leading tribe of the
Quda'a, had lived in the Syrian desert for so long before the Arab conquests
that it seems pointless to speculate where they may originally have come
from. When genealogists were called in to divide the Kufan population into
sevenths in 17 AH, they assigned the Quda'a to the same seventh as the
Hadramawt and other South Arabian tribes, suggesting that the Quda'a's
group was remembered to have South Arabian links (248). The Kufan
genealogists did not however assign the Quda'a to the same seventh as the
Himyar, the tribe with which the Syrian Quda'a were eventually to merge.

243) Tabari, Ser. ii, p. 474. Note also that 'Abdallah b. Yazid al-Razi, the father
of Khalid al-Qasi, is here said to have fought in Ibn al-Zubayr's side at Marj Rahit (ibid.,
p. 794), though he figures on Marwan's side in Ibn Babih, Khulal al-muhaddab, ed. I.
Lichtenstädter, Hyderabad 1942, p. 262.
244) Husayn b. Numayr b. Sakkam, who was in charge of the expulsion against
Ibn al-Zubayr at the time of Yazid's death, offered Ibn al-Zubayr his allegiance
when he heard that Yazid had died, on condition that he come to Syria; but Ibn al-
Zubayr refused to leave (Tabari, Ser. ii, p. 430ff.; Wellesbom, Kingdom, p. 166ff.).

245) For the privileges they demanded in return for supporting Marwan, see
246) Masudi, above, no. 233.
247) Thaw al-Sharqi b. al-Qatāni cited in Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Isābī, p. 69; similarly
Abū 'Amr b. al-'Ala cited in Baldhuri, Anbāb, vol. i, p. 16, § 35; Abū l-Baqā';
Manṣūri al-masqūtī fī sīhār al-muḥādāt, ed. S. M. Darbuka and M.
248) Shahid, Byzantium and the Arabs, p. 43.
249) Tabari, Ser. i, p. 249ff., where the seventh in question consists of Quda'a,
Ghassan b. Shobān who were part of the Quda'a in those days, Bajila, Khidāb, am
Kinda, Badrān and Azīd (Sarāt).
by a Kallāb woman, is said to have encouraged it in the hope of withdrawing tribal support from the Marwāntsīs. Thereafter, we are told, the alliance was clinched by Maslama b. ‘Abd al-Malik’s partisan behaviour in favour of Qays during the siege of Constantinople, and supported by Khalid al-Qahtāni, who lavished a great deal of money on his attempts to ‘spoil’ the genealogies of the Qudā’a and Ba‘īja (his own tribe). His efforts were reprehensible in the eyes of those who regarded the Qudā’a’s repudiation of their ancestor Ma‘add as unlawful, and the issue generated such passion that the Prophet was invoked in support of both sides, while at the same time ingenious harmonizations between the Ma‘add and Himyar genealogies were proposed. But though the descent of the Qudā’a continue to be disputed by scholars, the political alliance was a fact. It resulted in a great genealogical division between Syria proper and Syria-Jazira: Syria was overwhelmingly Yemeni in the four southern jarda of phíṣṭin, Urān, Dimashq and Himyar, overwhelmingly Qaysi in Qinnasrin and the Jazira.

The sources on Sufyānī history abound in schematized accounts of tribal relationships in which the Qudā’a are anachronistically subsumed under the label of Yemen. For example, we are told that the Yamaniyyīn supported the Umayyads in the Second Civil War, whereas the Qaysiyyīn supported the Zubayrids, or that Bassān b. Bishalal al-Kalbi was the chief of Qahtān, or that originally Mu‘awiyah only gave stipends to the Yemeni, but later he recruited 4,000 Qays and used the Yemenis for campaigns by sea, the Qaysi campaigns by land (which is incorrect even if we translate Yemen into Qudā’a). The Qudā’a tribes of the Sufyānid period are usually described as Yemeni in the secondary literature, but the neat division between Qays and Yemen in Syria was an outcome of the Civil War, not a factor behind its outbreak. The parallel story of tribal rivalries in Iraq and Khurasan is more complicated, but all we need to note here is that the tribes involved included Qays again, though far outnumbered by their Tamimi allies, and Azd ‘Umān in alliance with Bakr/Rabi’a. The Azd ‘Umān and Bakr were both tribes from eastern rather than southern Arabia, so or the face of it there was not much overlap between the rivalries in Syria on the one hand and Iraq and Khurasan on the other. But there was too much contact between Syria and the eastern provinces for the hostilities to remain discrete: the feuds between Kalb and Qays in the Syrian desert had repercussions in Iraq, and the Syrian Qays took a keen interest in the fate of Qaysis in Khurasan. The Syrian tribe known as Azd came from the Sarrāt in South Arabia rather than Oman, as did the Azd of Kufa and a few of those in Basra, and thanks to this fact the Basran and Khurasani Azdīs came to be identified as Yemenis too. We thus have a situation in which tribesmen everywhere could, should they so wish, identify themselves as members of the bloc composed mostly of Qays in Syria and mostly of Tamim elsewhere, the group in question being known as Mudar, or as members of the bloc composed mostly of Qudā’a in Syria and mostly of Azd elsewhere, the bloc in question being known as Yemen.

172 Abî ‘1-‘Ba‘qî, Mansûh, vol. i, p. 338, where the informant Na‘r b. Mārusū al-Kalbi is among those who disapproved.
173 The Prophet pronounced the Qudā’a to be Himyarīs (above, note 253) or he pronounced them to be of Ma‘add (Abî ‘1-‘Ba‘qî, Mansûh, vol. i, p. 340 (vīn ‘A‘l-ṣaḥr)).
176 Cf. Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 708: wālī-kul huwa Qays kutlun hâ, lī-zira fi-hum ah Valī-l Fā’ma. This is correct if the Jazira is understood to include Qinnasrin. Compare Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 170.
177 Ibn ‘Abd Rabboh, ‘Iṣl, vol. iv, p. 305. (Higher up on the same page Bassān b. Bishalal al-Kalbi says that there are many Qays in Urān and describes them as his people, which cannot be right; Qays must be a mistake for Qudā’a.)
179 Aṣbahānī, vol. xx, pp. 208f.; cf. Bahār, Anasib, vol. iv, p. 82; Ibn ‘Abdīr ‘Akkāl, Tahdīth, vol. v, pp. 1190f. A Yemeni such as Mālik b. Ḫubayra al-Sakahînī Kinda conducted campaigns by both land and sea under Mu‘awiyah (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 82, 84, 86 = M. G. Morony (tr.), The History of al-Tabarî, vol. xvii, Almanay 1887, pp. 88, 91, 99), and ‘Amr b. Murra al-Juhayn, a Yemeni by the standards of these sources, is said to have conducted a land campaign against the Byzantines the year before Mu‘awiyah died (ib., p. 188 = Morony, p. 199).
182 Dixon, Umayyad Caliphate, pp. 96f.
183 Cf. Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 66 = Morony, p. 69; cf. also Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 210 ("The dualism of the eastern groups at last united with that of the western, mainly through the fault of the Qays.")
184 Cf. Et?, s.v. ‘Azd’.

4 Islam LXX, 1951, 1.
The Marwânis

But why should they have wished to identify themselves in such terms? Obviously, once the Marwânis, were in power they had to conciliate the disgruntled Qays of Syria-Jazira. The latter remained in a state of opposition for several years after Ma‘ṣûr Bihî, conducting raids with the Kalb and eventually also with Taghlib, a Jazira tribe on whose territories they had encroached, and doing their best to obstruct the Marwânid attempt to reconquer the rest of the Islamic world from the Zubayrids. ‘Abd al-Malik allegedly refused to hear poetry composed by Mu‘ājir with reference to their Zubayrid sympathies; but he nonetheless spent a great deal of time trying to win them over and eventually established marriage alliances with them: his two heir-apparents al-Walid and Sulayman were both sons of an ‘Abi woman from a chieflie house in Qinnasrin. So despite the privileges that the Qudâ’a had withdrawn from Marwân, they never regained their former predominance, and they are said to have resented this fact. But the feud died down, and something else must have intervened to shape the subsequent evolution.

The operative factor is presumably to be sought in military developments. In the course of the Marwânid period the old citizen militia began to give way to professional armies, with the result that governors increasingly had to be chosen from among generals capable of running the army, whatever their tribal background might be. Previously, practically all top governors had been chosen from among kinsmen of the caliph, that is to say from among men distinguished by their loyalty towards their own caliphal family on the one hand and by their neutrality in the tribal rivalries on the other. This was also how ‘Abd al-Malik began; as has been seen, it was not how he continued.

A general appointed to Iraq and/or Khurasan controlled a huge number of military and administrative sub-governorships for which he had to find trustworthy men. On whom then was he going to rely? There was no shortage of eager candidates among his officers; on the contrary, there were too many: some sort of criteria of selection had to be worked out. The obvious criterion was kinship. People always relied on members of their own family where they could, but even large families offered an insufficient number of candidates and no governor could hope for popularity with his troops without rewarding at least some of them with lucrative posts. Close relatives, the obvious choice was fellow-tribesmen. Who then was a fellow-tribesman of the governor? Clearly anyone eager for appointment now had an interest in presenting himself as a loyal member of the governor’s descent group, however remote, and so the upper levels of the genealogical tree acquired urgent relevance: a Laythi was a Kinâni and thus a Mudarj, in which capacity he could offer his services to the governor if the latter was a Mudarj, that is a Qaysi and thus a Mudarj too. But if a man stressed his allegiance to Mudarj in the hope of making himself eligible in the eyes of a Marwân, he thereby rendered himself ineligible for appointment if the next governor happened to be a Yemeni, for the latter would not unnaturally view the zeal displayed on behalf of Qays/Mudar as a declaration of inability to serve men from other descent groups. Once a tribal group had publicly declared its alignment, it was hard to go back. The best one could do thereafter was to pull as many strings as possible to secure the appointment of a governor from one’s own tribal group.

Things clearly had not reached this point when al-Hajâj was appointed. He had risen through the army, but he was also an affinal kinsman of the Umayyads, and it was as such that he behaved: like everyone else he relied greatly on his own family, but he freely appointed men from diverse tribal backgrounds in addition, clearly feeling that tribal rivalries did not affect him. But when Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Asdi, an ex-governor on the run, fled to Sulayman, an heir-apparent threatened with deposition, high politics caused the provincial competition for office to polarize. Everyone in or aspiring to appointment now had to place bets on one or the other candidate for the throne, which in its turn meant placing bets on one or the other network of kinsmen, allies and friends with which the candidates were associated; declaring oneself a loyal member of Yazid’s Azd meant damning oneself in the eyes of al-Hajâj’s Thaqif and Qata’yba’s Bihâli. When Yazid b. al-Muhallab was appointed to Iraq and Khurasan, the men he appointed in his turn were chosen from the Yemen with a new consistency: loyalty to the larger group containing Azd was rewarded, the reliability of that containing Thaqif apparently doubted. All governors thereafter proved highly sensitive to the tribal factional membership of their subordinates. Jarrah b. ‘Abdallah al-Hakami/Yemen, who had served under both al-Hajâj and Yazid b. al-Muhallab before being appointed to Khurasan by ‘Umar II, was converted.
into an ‘asabiya on behalf of his Yemeni people in Khurasan, clearly because his troops were too partisan for neutrality to be possible; otherwise governors responded by trying to manipulate tribal genealogies so as to strengthen their own factional support; and the troops who ganged up under the names of Qays/Mudar and Yemen found the behaviour rewarding, for all provincial appointments went to their own faction when the governor was one of theirs. Given that there was only one top-governor in each province, there was only room for two competing groups, one in and one out, so the polarization would presumably have taken place even without the Yazid-Sulayman episode. But this episode undoubtedly had a triggering effect.

That the antagonism had a bearing on appointments is explicit in the sources. ‘Never did I see such ‘asabiya’, a Syrian Yemeni exclaimed when he heard of Nasr b. Sayyār’s uniformly Mudar appointments, only to be reassured that previous ‘asabiya had been just as bad (presumably a reference to the Yemeni appointments under Asad al-Qasri).’ When Yusuf b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays, the governor of Iraq, tried to withdraw Qaysi support from Nasr b. Sayyār in Khurasan, he ‘promised that if Maghribi [b. Ahmar al-Numayri/Qays] would impugn Nasr’s reputation in front of Hishām, he would make him governor of Sind’. Maghribi’s acceptance of the offer was treacherous, for Nasr had favoured him, among other things by appointing Maghribi’s nephew to Judjan and putting him in charge of the fifth known as the Abī al-‘idāya (to which the Qays belonged).’ When the Yemenis murdered al-Walid II in Syria and appointed their own governor to Khurasan, Nasr b. Sayyār reacted by trying to unite the factions around him: ‘the Azd in Khurasan turned timid by spreading false rumours that Manzir b.

277) See the reference given above, note 28.
278) The sons of Qatiba b. Muslim al-Bahili/Qays had tried to present Bahili as part of ‘Taghib/Rabi‘a, which was resented by the Bahili/Rabi‘a who feared that Taghib might become too numerous thereby (Tabari, see ii, pp. 1473f., where the Taghib invoke this genealogy to make a descendant of Qatiba cooperate with them; the Ma‘/Adr/Yemen had also claimed the Bahili as theirs), Khalid al-Qasri successfully endeavoured to strengthen the Yemeni descent of Qatiba and Qays‘a (cf. the reference given above, note 237). Bishr b. Sa‘dwan al-Kalbi requested and received permission from Yazid II to turn the Qays‘a into a military unit of their own in Egypt (Kindl, Governors pp. 70ff.). (The future) Marwan II restored the Asadi genealogy of Judhan, obviously in the hope of turning a troublesome Yemeni group into a Modjart one, but without success (Badushuri, Assaf, vol. i, p. 26, 68f.; cf. Crone, Slaves, p. 16f., on his troubles with Thabit b. Nuf‘ al-Judhan). The claim that the genealogy is devoid of interest in genealogy for purposes other than abuse now strikes us as odd (Crone, Slaves, note 312).
280) Tabari, see ii, pp. 172ff. = Hillenbrand, p. 60, 62.

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Jumhūr [al-Kalbi/Yemen, the new governor] was coming there. Nasr preached a sermon... Nasr appointed governors from Rabi‘a and the Yamaniyya.)

The faction could of course have had a bearing on appointments without being actually generated by them, but it was only in the context of military opposition for office that the supposed descent groups held together. The civilian South Arabian of Hims loathed the Qays‘a soldiers with whom they were assumed to be allied, dismissing them as despicable bedawī. But when the Syrian Qādis‘a sent Manzir b. Jumhūr al-Kalbi/Yemen as governor to Khurasan, they nonetheless generated immense excitement among the Azdī there, because a Syrian Yemeni was bound to appoint Khurasani Yemenis to office; hence Nasr b. Sayyār was forced to give appointments to the factions.

Governorship generated intense competition because they were positions of power, prestige and above all wealth, not only in that they were salaried, but also in that all governors from the highest to the lowest would divert part of the tax revenues into their own pockets, almost as of right: everyone knew that they would do so, and they were rarely called to account before the top governor was dismissed, which normally meant that all of his sub-governors were dismissed as well. This is why governors of the Marwanid period were usually junked and subjected to torture when their appointments came to an end: termination of office meant forcible segregation of spoils. Appointment was thus immensely lucrative, while dismissal meant loss of power and wealth alike, possibly of health as well and not infrequently of life. In other words, the participants in the competition played for high stakes, and this intensified the antagonism between the competitors. When a new top-governor was appointed, he would start by maltreating his
predecessor and/or his appointees, only to be subjected to worse treatment when he and his appointees were dismissed in their turn, the faction which ousted him being now bent not just on the extraction of money, but also on revenge. One ex-governor committed suicide when he was caught by the rival faction. When the new governor belonged to the same descent group as his predecessor, factional loyalties were strained, and the behaviour of Yusuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays suggests that the eastern Qays/Mudar faction was close to splitting into two in response to the apparent elimination of the Yemenis.

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The faction was a purely provincial phenomenon down to the Third Civil War because it was only in the provinces that the generals took over as governors, Syria continuing to be ruled by old-fashioned kiname of the caliph and tribal nobles. In the Third Civil War, however, the generals took over Syria as well.

The key to the coup of 744 is presumably to be sought in the Marwânid tendency to rely on men of Qays/Mudar for the governorship of the eastern provinces, especially Kharasan, which in its turn is in need of explanation. The fact that the Marwânids intermarried with the Qays of Syro-Jazira did not prevent them from reaping preponderantly on Yemenis in the western provinces, where the local tribes were overwhelmingly Yemenis too. Possibly, they preferred governors of Qays/Mudar in Kharasan because the Kharasani troops had come to be dominated Mudaris. The figures given for the fifth in Qutaiba’s army do not support this conjecture, but several armies had been despatched from Iraq since Qutaiba’s time, and as has been

288) The Qaysi Sa’id al-Israash is explicitly said to have left Khudhayr’s governors alone, suggesting that this was unusual (ibid., p. 1437 = Power, p. 167). Sa’id himself was eventually despatched (presumably by his Khilâf/Qaysi successor) to ‘Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazari/Qays in Iraq, where he narrowly avoided being tortured to death (ibid., pp. 1535ff. = Power, pp. 1835ff.). We are not told how Junayd al-Murr/Qays treated the governors of Ashr as-Sulami/Qays, but Junayd’s own governors were jailed and tortured by ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Abdallah al-Hi’ti/Qays, who would presumably have done the same to Junayd if he had not died (ibid., pp. 3, 1568).

289) Cf. Crone, Slaves, p. 44.
290) In Kharasan the Umayyad Sa’id Khudhayr arrested the governors of ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Abdallah al-Qa SSR/Qays, appointed by ‘Umar II, but not apparently ‘Abd al-Rahman himself; however an Umayyad did not really count as a Qaysi (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1419 = Power, p. 150). The Qaysi Sa’id al-Israash was explicitly said to have left Khudhayr’s governors alone, suggesting that this was unusual (ibid., p. 1437 = Power, p. 167). Sa’id himself was eventually despatched (presumably by his Khilâf/Qaysi successor) to ‘Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazari/Qays in Iraq, where he narrowly avoided being tortured to death (ibid., pp. 1535ff. = Power, pp. 1835ff.). We are not told how Junayd al-Murr/Qays treated the governors of Ashr as-Sulami/Qays, but Junayd’s own governors were jailed and tortured by ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Abdallah al-Hi’ti/Qays, who would presumably have done the same to Junayd if he had not died (ibid., pp. 3, 1568).

290) Crone, Slaves, p. 40 and appendix 21 thereto.

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seen, these are credited with the view that most of the Kharasani troops were Tarimis. In addition, however, the Qays of Syro-Jazira were frontier-troops and thus better suited than their Yemeni counterparts to the frontier warfare of Kharasan. Possibly, they were also better horsemen. Ibn ‘Abd Rabih has it that most of Marwan’s Qodsai troops at Marj Rahit were infantry, whereas most of Dabah’s Quayyra were cavalrymen, and infinitely more numerous to boot. This is late information of dubious value, but the Mesopotamian desert must in fact have been better suited to horse-rearing than its Syrian counterpart.

At all events, as far as control of the most lucrative and prestigious provinces of the caliphate were concerned, that was Iraq and Kharasan, the Syrian Yemenis being doing badly in the competition; and since local troops related to their Syrian governors on the basis of descent, the Yemenis of Iraq and Kharasan were doing badly too. The Syrian Yemenis were responsible for garrison duties all over the empire, and above all in Iraq. Pae Shan, there is no evidence that they resented this duty, what they resented being rather that they did not have undisputed control of this province. They did rule Iraq for a full fifteen years under Khalid al-Qasri (a very long time in view of the short tenures that most governors enjoyed), but they lost control of it again when Khalid was dismissed in favour of yet another member of al-Hajjaj’s family, who was unwisely allowed by al-Walid II to torture Khalid al-Qasri to death. It was against this background that the Yamaniya planned their coup, which obviously was not meant to end their role as imperial troops, but rather to give them control of the Syrian metropolis in which the highest decisions, including those affecting the allocation of Iraq, were made. Whatever their intentions, there certainly is no doubt that the events of 744 amounted to a military coup. The generals who had so far governed the provinces now took over the capital as well, and though the Yamaniya were to be ousted, first by Marwan II and next by the Hashimiyya, the men who ousted them were generals too.

The Marwânid period generated its own spate of schematizing statements regarding tribal relationships. Thus Mu’awiya, who only gave stipends to Yemenis according to one piece of wisdom, recommended governors of Mudar according to another, allegedly instructing his governor of Iraq to honour the Yemenis in public but to stay aloof from them in private.

289) Above, p. 8.
290) Ibn ‘Abd Rabih, ‘Ijdi, vol. iv, p. 308. Marwan allegedly had 13,000 men, mostly footsoldiers, whereas Dabah had 60,000 men, mostly mounted. Elsewhere we are told that Marwan had 7,000 men against Dabah’s 30,900 (Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 175).
no doubt because he had foreseen their murder of al-Walid or the 'Abbāsid revolution. An Iraqi of the Second Civil War supposedly opined that whether the Marwānids or the Zabūyraids were going to win, their allegiances would lie with Qays, a remarkable display of foresight given that the Marwānids were at odds with Qays as the Umayyads. Qays were ‘Uthmānis and affine of kings, al-Jāhiz informs us with little disregard for the fact that Qays were nothing of the kind before ‘Abd al-Malik; but this being the Qaysi image, Yazid III allegedly opined that the strength of Qays was achieved at the expense of Islam, which is very much what Shaban tells us too. But Yazid III’s thesis was problematic in that the Prophet, the Hashimites and the Ṭaʾābūn were all of Qays/Mudar, so others held that the Jāhiliyya belonged to Yemen, Islam to Mudar and fitna to Rabšt’ (283). The Rabšt’ were given to fitna because they were angry with God for sending prophet of Mudar, and this is why they were Khārijites (284). Or maybe it was the Yemenis who were given to fitna, for they killed ‘Uthmān, renounced obedience to ‘Abd al-Malik (under Ibn al-Asb’ath) and rebelled again under Yazid b. al-Mujallab (285). But there was also a case for the view that the real troublemakers were Mudar, for they killed the Prophet’s family (i.e. al-Ḫusayn), supported the Umayyads and oppressed the Khurasanis, which is again a view close to Shaban’s (286). The organizers of the Hashimite daʿwa in Khurasan supposedly told their missionaries to reside among Yemenis and conciliate Mudar, or to honour the Yemen, be wary of Rabšt’ and sly the Mudarís, one way or another reversing Muʿawiyah’s advice (287). And so one could go on. It should be obvious that tropes of this kind are not to be taken literally. The faction undoubtedly played a role in the ‘Abbāsid or (more properly) Hashimit Revolution; the inner core of the daʿwa was dominated by Yemenis; Abū Musām briefly allied himself with al-Kirmānī’s Yemeni faction; and numerous Yemenis in both Iraq and Syria defected to the Hashimites. But the Hashimite daʿwa was not a Yemeni revolution in the sense that most of its participants were Yemenis, still less in the sense that they were drawn from al-Kirmānī’s faction. There is a real problem here, but neither formulaic wisdom nor the assumption that Qays/Mudar and Yemen were political parties will help us solve it.

(288) Thus Daghfal the genealogist in Ibn Ṭahm al-Ṭabari, ‘ṣoḥb. vol. iii, p. 329.
(290) Thus a Tamimi to Khālid al-Qasrī in Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1468.
(291) Thus a Sulami (i.e. Qayya) nasb of the ʿĀṣār of al-Ṭabari, Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1866 = Williams, pp. 94f. Al-Manṣūr allegedly went further than that: Mudar had no right, at all to claim the Prophet as one of theirs, for they (= Qaysiyah) had rejected him, whereas the Yemen (= Ansar) had accepted him, and did he not say “Abū and the Ash’aris and Kinds are of me, and I am of them!” (Aṣṣār, Mawṣul, pp. 219ff.). Presumably it was statements of this kind that prompted Goldziher to trace the origins of the ʿuṣūlīyya between Qays/Mudar and Yemen to rivalry between Quraysh and the Ansār (cf. above, note 8).